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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a Utah 
corpora ti on, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
UNIONAMERICA, INC. , a corpora-
tion, aka WESTMOR; RAMSHIRE, 
INC., a corporation; WILLIAM 
R. STEVENSON; PARK CITY RESER-
VATIONS, INC, a corpora ti on 
dba SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F. 
REED and GARY COLE, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 17359 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case in which Appellant seeks to recover from 
Respondents $96, 000, an amount equal to a 6%· real estate listing 
broker's commission based on the sale of real property at a purchase 
price of $1,600,000, plus interest, punitive damages, attorneys' fees 
and costs; and Respondent, Park City Reservations, Inc., seeks to 
recover from Appellant $57,600 as a real estate selling broker's com-
mission equal to 60% of said 6% commission, plus interest. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Following a trial to the court without a jury, the Trial 
Court awarded Appellant judgment against Unionamerica, Inc. for the 
amount of $96,000 plus interest, but the Trial Court refused to award 
Appellant any attorneys' fees or costs. The Trial Court also awarded 
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.. 
Park City Reservations, Inc. judgment against Appellant in the amov 
of $57, 600 plus interest. The Trial Court also awarded Appellant 
judgment against Unionamerica, Inc. for the amount of a listing 
broker's 6% commission in the separate sum of $2, 550 plus interest, 
based on a separate sale transaction, but again refused to award 
Appellant any attorneys' fees or costs. The Trial Court also rulec 
against Appellant and in favor of Respondents on other causes of 
action pled as tort, and refused to award Appellant any punitive 
damages. This appeal contests only the following portions of the 
Judgment: 
1. The portion of the of Judgment in favor of Park C: 
Reservations, Inc. and against Appellant for the amountcl 
selling broker's commission of $57,600, plus interest; 
2. The Trial Court's failure to award compensatory 
damages against Park City Reservations, Inc. as an offset: 
the portion of the Judgment in favor of Park City Reserva· 
tions, Inc.; 
3. The Trial Court's failure to award compensatory 
damages against all Respondents other than Park City Reser· 
vations, Inc. in the amount of the portion of the Judgment 
favor of Park City Reservations, Inc.; 
4. The Trial court's failure to award punitive damage 
against all Respondents; 
5. The Trial court's failure to award Appellant its 
attorneys' fees and costs against Unionamerica, Inc. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks: 
1. Reversal of that portion of the Judgment awarding Park 
City Reservations, Inc. any amount from Appellant, and judgment in 
Appellant's favor and against Park City Reservations, Inc., no cause 
of action; or 
2. In the event that portion of the Judgment in favor of PCR 
is affirmed on this appeal, an award of compensatory damages against 
all Respondents, or any of them, in the amount of any such award in 
favor of Park City Reservations, Inc.; and 
3. Remand of the case for the purpose of taking evidence to 
determine the amount of punitive damages to which Appellant is en-
titled from all Respondents; and 
4. Remand of the case for the purpose of taking evidence to 
determine the amount of attorneys' fees and costs to which Appellant 
is entitled, including such attorneys fees and costs incurred with 
respect to prosecuting this appeal; or in lieu of the relief sought in 
paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 above 
5. Remand of the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Transcript of Proceedings contained in the Record on 
Appeal will be referred to herein by the letter "T." followed by the 
number of the specific page or pages referred to. Exhibits will be 
referred to herein as "Ex." followed by the number of the specific 
exhibit or exhibits referred to. Two witnesses, whose testimony is 
pertinent to this appeal, Robert Volk and Jack W. Davis, testified at 
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trial by way of deposition which testimony by stipulation was not 
transcribed as part of the Transcript of Proceedings. A d' 
ccor ingJ; 
their testimony will be cited as "Volk Dep." and "Davi· s o " 
ep. res~ 
tively, followed by the page or pages referred to. 
1. At all times pertinent hereto, Appellant was a Utah t 
poration in good standing having its principal place of busine~f 
Sununi t County, Utah and was owned by its sole shareholder Harold 1 
Taylor ("Taylor"), a plaintiff in the Trial Court but not a par~: 
this appeal. Taylor was a real estate broker licensed by the Stat: 
Utah to conduct his business in the State of Utah, was the indirii 
Utah licensed real estate broker acting for Appellant, and Appellr 
was a corporate real estate broker duly licensed by the State ofl 
to conduct its business in the State of Utah. '11 1 and 2, Tri~~ 
Findings; Ex. P-1, P-35, P-36, P-37 and P-38: T. 30, 31. 
2. Respondent Unionamer ica, Inc. and its wholly owned su~ 
sidiary Respondent Ramshire, Inc. were foreign corporations qualifi: 
to transact their businesses in the State of Utah, having their pr!' 
cipal place of business in the State of Utah in Sununit County. 
William R. Stevenson ("Stevenson") was a vice-president of Ramshire, 
Inc. and the authorized agent of Unionamerica, Inc. and Ramshire, 
Inc. 1111 3, 4 and 6, Trial Court Findings. Unionamerica, Inc. and 
Ramshire, Inc. were one and the same entity for purposes of the sub-
ject lawsuit, which entity will be referred to herein as "Union-
america." T. 33. 
3. Respondent Park City Reservations, Inc. ("PCR") was a 
Utah corporation having its principal place of business in Summit 
county, Utah and was owned by its sole shareholder Respondent Harry 
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lt Reed ("Reed"). n 5 and 7 I Trial Court Findings. PCR "doing business 
11: as Skyline Realty" was both a defendant and a counterclaimant in the 
!S.• Trial Court. 
4. Reed was a real estate broker licensed by the State of 
1 t utah to conduct his business in the State of Utah. However, at all 
times pertinent hereto, Reed was a branch broker for a sole proprie-
torship owned by Ladd E. Christensen ("Christensen"), an individual, 
y: who did business under the assumed name of Skyline Realty and Invest-
~ ment co. At all times pertinent hereto, Christensen was the broker 
~ for such sole proprietorship. Ex. P-45, P-46, P-47, P-48, P-49, P-50: 
lt T. 630, 631. Christensen has never been a party to the subject law-
Ut suit, either in his own name or under any assumed name. 
Ct 5. Christensen's company was a different company than PCR, 
and at trial Reed could not produce nor did he know of any document 
u~ that would establish that Reed at any time was ever a broker for PCR, 
fr the defendant and Counterclaimant in the subject lawsuit. T. 624, 637. 
ri· 6. No one, including Reed was ever a broker for PCR and at 
no time was PCR a corporate real estate broker licensed by the State 
re, of Utah to conduct its business in the State of Utah. Ex. P-34: T. 
586. 
7. In July of 1978, after the subject transaction had been 
10· completed, Reed as an individual doing business as Skyline Land 
Company became his own real estate broker and was no longer a licensed 
real estate salesman or broker/branch manager under Christensen. Ex. 
D-43, P-44, P-48, P-49, P-50, P-51: T. 633, 634. 
B. When the original complaint was filed and served, Reed 
i was named personally as a defendant doing business as Skyline Realty, 
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and PCR was not made a party to the action. Prior to the time a~~ 
the defendants had responded to the original Complaint, Stephen G, 
Crockett ("Crockett"), as counsel for PCR, Reed and Cole, teleph~~ 
cally advised counsel for Appellant that the name "Skyline Realty" Wi 
a "dba" for the corporation, PCR, rather than Reed, and Crockett the~ 
suggested that an Amended Complaint be filed and served prior to any 
defendants formally responding to the original Complaint. Thereafter 
prior to the time any of the defendants formally responded to the 
original Complaint, and with the oral approval of counsel for all 
defendants, counsel for Appellant caused the Amended Complaint to be 
I 
filed and served upon all defendants, including PCR, the new corporat• 
defendant. The naming of PCR as a defendant was done in respoMe~ 
Crockett's direct representations to counsel for Appellant that PCR 
was the proper party in the case and was in fact the entity doing 
business under the assumed name "Skyline Realty." September 21, llH 
Affidavit of Kent B Linebaugh in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For 
Leave to File a Fourth Amended Complaint (the "September 21, 1979 
Affidavit"); and H 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the September 3, 1980 Affida· 
vit of Kent B Linebaugh in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Order 
Amending Findings of Fact, Making Additional Findings of Fact, 
Amending Conclusions of Law, Adopting Additional Conclusions of Law 
and Amending Judgment or in the Alternative, Granting a New Trial (the 
"September 3, 1980 Affidavit"). 
9. On November 30, 1978, Reed stated under oath: "I entH~ 
into an agreement with Harold w. Taylor wherein we were to split the 
-6-
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commission on a 60-40 basis. My company was to receive the 60% • 
If 3 of Affidavit of Harry F. Reed in Opposition to Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment by Plaintiff. 
10. On December 8, 1978, counsel for Appellant took the 
deposition of Reed at which time Reed testified that Skyline Realty 
was a company he formed with the actual name being Park City Reserva-
tions, Inc., and that the name Skyline was an assumed named for PCR. 
In his deposition, Reed further testified that PCR was the only cor-
poration he had ever owned and that it was originally incorporated 
under the name of Park City Reservations Inc. Reed further testified 
that for purposes of the subject lawsuit, the parties were only to be 
concerned with the corporation PCR doing business as Skyline, and that 
since November of 1976 he had only been doing business in the corpo-
rate form of Park City Reservations, Inc. doing business as Skyline. 
11 7 of the September 3, 1980 Affidavit; pp. 7-10 of Reed's deposition. 
11. During the first week of January, 1980, during counsel 
for Appellant's due diligence investigation of public records as part 
of his preparation for the trial herein which began January 14, 1980, 
said counsel first discovered PCR had not filed an assumed name certi-
ficate to conduct its business under the assumed name of Skyline 
Realty, but that defendant Reed in his individual capacity had filed 
an application to conduct his business under the assumed name of 0 Sky-
line Land company." It was also at that same time that said counsel 
first discovered that PCR had never been licensed as a corporate real 
~state broker. Ex. P-34, P-51, P-52; ~ 10 of the September 3, 1980 
Affidavit. 
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12. By the time counsel for Appellant made the discoveries 
as recited in the next preceding paragraph, trial of the above cap-
tioned matter was scheduled for less than 30 days hence, and said 
counsel was accordingly prohibited by Rule 10 of the Supplemental 
Rules Adopted by the Third Judicial District to Rules of Practice in 
the District Courts of the State of Utah from moving to dismiss the 
claims of PCR on either the ground that PCR was not a licensed corpo· 
rate real estate broker or on the ground that PCR had not made appli· 
cation for an assumed name certificate authorizing PCR to do businesi 
under the assumed name of Skyline Realty. Accordingly, counsel fm 
Appellant explained to the Trial Court the reasons why such facts haa 
not been presented to the Trial Court in advance of trial. Over 
Respondents' objections to the contrary, the Trial Court expressly 
held that counsel for Respondents were not surprised by Appellant's 
evidence that PCR was not in fact a licensed corporate real estate 
broker or that no assumed name certificate had been filed for PCR. 
12 of the September 3, 1980 Affidavit; T. 640, 641. 
13. At trial, according to Reed and based upon the represen· 
tat ions of Reed's counsel, for purposes of the subject lawsuit: Reed': 
claims were really the claims of the corporation, PCR; PCR and Skylin' 
Realty were one and the same corporation; and the names Skyline 
Realty, Skyline Realty and Investment Company, Skyline Realty, Inc., 
Skyline Realty and Park City Reservations, Inc. were all different 
names for the same corporate entity, PCR, which is the defendant and 
counter claimant in the subject lawsuit. T. 428, 429, 607, 623, 62 41 
627, 628' 629. 
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14. Neither PCR, Reed and/or Cole ever filed an assumed name 
certificate with the Secretary of State of the State of Utah to do 
business under the assumed name of either Skyline Realty or Skyline 
Realty and Investment Company. Ex. P-52; T. 638. 
15. No Respondent presented or proferred any evidence that 
any assumed name certificate had ever been filed on behalf of PCR to 
enable PCR to do business under any assumed name. T. 650, 651. 
16. The first and only time that Respondents ever claimed 
that Appellant had waived any rights that Appellant had arising out of 
PCR's failure to be licensed as a corporate real estate broker and/or 
PCR's failure to file an assumed name certificate to do business under 
the assumed name of Skyline Realty, was after the Respondents had 
rested their cases and at the conclusion of the opening argument of 
Appellant's counsel. T. 650, 653. 
17. At all times pertinent hereto, Respondent Gary Cole 
("Cole") was a real estate salesman licensed by the State of Utah to 
conduct his business in the State of Utah under Christensen as his 
primary broker and under Reed as his broker/branch manager. Ex. P-46. 
18. Prior to and on February 17, 1977, in the Summit County 
District Court, Taylor had pending against Unionamerica and others a 
lawsuit pursuant to which Taylor sought to recover damages for breach 
of contract and certain torts. One of the other defendants in that 
previous lawsuit was Greater Park City Corporatio~ ("GPCC") whose 
president was Ray Johnson ("Johnson"). Neither GPCC nor Johnson is a 
party to the subject lawsuit. On February 17, 1977, Taylor acting on 
behalf of Appellant, Stevenson acting on behalf of Unionamerica and 
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Johnson acting on behalf of GPCC, without the aid of counsel, nego-
tiated, drafted, had typed, and signed an agreement settling the 
aforesaid lawsuit (the "Settlement Agreement"). Pursuant to the 
Settlement Agreement Unionamerica and GPCC severally agreed to enter 
into 5 year exclusive listing agreements with Appellant with respect 
to any Summit County real properties owned by either of them which 
real properties they wished to sell. 11 9, Trial Court Findings, 
Appendix C7 Ex. P-2, Appendix E. 
19. The Settlement Agreement required Appellant to perfun 
the usual real estate broker activities incumbent upon a listing 
broker transacting its business in Summit County, and Appellant per· 
formed all services and discharged all obligations to be performed< 
discharged by it pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. 11 2, Memorar 
dum Decision, Appendix B1 11 1, Trial Court Conclusions, Appendix C. 
20. The Settlement Agreement also required Unionamerica ar 
GPCC to pay to Appellant a 6% commission on all of their respective 
Summit County real properties sold during the aforesaid 5 year peric 
and at the same time required Appellant to split said 6% commission 
with a selling broker, with 60% of said commission going to such 
selling broker and 40% of such commission being retained by Appellar 
as the listing broker. ,I 9, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Ex. 
P-2, Appendix E. Said provision in the Settlement Agreement requiri 
Appellant and any such selling brokers to split the 6% commissions 
will be referred to herein as the "60-40 Provision." 
21. While the real estate brokers in Park City had not 
entered into any written multiple listing agreement, at all times 
pertinent hereto the real estate industry in such area, in custom an 
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practice, had a multiple listing arrangement which according to Reed 
was referred to as the "Park City Multiple," and which Reed charac-
terized as a "casual multiple listing service." Reed personally 
participated in organizing the Park City Multiple and, according to 
Reed, pursuant thereto the participating brokers would exchange 
notices of listings weekly and split sales commissions with 60% of the 
commissions going to the selling brokers and 40% of the commissions 
going to the listing brokers. T. 433, 478-480, 486, 490, 491, 507-508. 
22. Although the Park City Multiple was not in writing, Reed 
personally felt bound by its customs and practices. Reed and other 
Park City Brokers, including Appellant and Taylor, participated in the 
Park City Multiple, and both Reed and Appellant had exchanged notices 
of listings and had split commissions between them in 20-30 trans-
actions over a period of several years. Ex. P-13, P-29~ T. 441, 442, 
479-491, 516. 
23. According to Stevenson, at the time the 60-40 Provision 
was agreed to, Stevenson also knew how the Park City Multiple worked, 
including the fact that it was the custom and practice under the Park 
City Multiple for a selling broker and a listing broker to split the 
commissions on a 60%-40% basis. T. 283, 291, 292. 
24. Also on February 17, 1977, shortly after entering into 
the Settlement Agreement that same day, and pursuant to the Settlement 
Agreement, Appellant and Unionamerica entered into a written vacant 
property exclusive listing (the "Listing") pursuant to which Listing 
Unionamerica listed for sale with Appellant as the listing broker 
approximately 10.5 acres of real property (the "Village Land") owned 
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by Unionamerica and located in Summit County. ,, 10, Trial court 
Findings, Apendix C; Ex. P-3, Appendix F. 
25. Even though Unionamerica had entered into the Listi~ 
calling for a purchase price of $1,685,000 for the Village Land, a~ 
Appellant began working on a sale at that price, Stevenson was not 
willing to have Unionamerica sell the Village Land at that price but 
didn't disclose such fact to Appellant. T. 382, 383. 
26. Prior to the sale of the Village Land pursuant to the 
subject sale, Dempsey Construction Company ("Dempsey") through Appel· 
lant indicated a definite interest in purchasing the Village Land. 
Although Stevenson knew of Dempsey's interest and that Dempsey was 
soliciting a counteroffer from Unionamerica, Stevenson still did not 
properly respond to Dempsey's overtures as a result of which he was 
severely reprimanded by his boss at Unionamerica. Ex. P-3; T. 306, 
310. 
27. On February 26, 1979, PCR, Reed and Cole moved for par· 
tial summary judgment herein. Judge Bryant H. Croft denied said 
motion, but with respect to the legal effect of the Settlement Agree· 
ment and the Listing, Judge Croft held as follows: 
The court finds that the Settlement Agreement and 
the Listing Agreement contemplate that other 
parties not involved in the lawsuit might find 
buyers for the listed properties and negotiate a 
sale therefor, and that neither agreement contains 
any express or implied provision that Unionamerica 
or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer" to 
plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now resolved for 
all future proceedings in this case. 
Judge Croft's Order, Appendix A. 
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28. The Trial Court considered itself bound by Judge croft's 
order. ,, 3, Memorandum Decision, Appendix B: 11 4, Trial Court Con-
clusions, Appendix C: T. 567. 
29. For purposes of this case the parties stipulated that 
the term "walk-in" is understood to be a potential buyer who comes to 
the owner unsolicited and not referred to the owner by a licensed real 
estate agent, and the term will have that meaning when used herein. 
T. 201. 
30. In custom and practice, upon Appellant and Unionamerica 
entering into both the Settlement Agreement and the Listing, all 
licensed brokers became eligible to become a selling broker with 
respect to the Village Land. T. 552, 556-558. 
31. Although the Settlement Agreement required Unionamerica 
to enter into an "exclusive listing agreement" with Appellant, the 
Settlement Agreement did not specify the details of such listing. 
Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of Utah, there are 
two types of exclusive listing agreements in use, which types are 
known as either an exclusive right to sell listing, or an exclusive 
agency listing. Pursuant to the same custom and practice under an 
exclusive right to sell listing, the owner cannot sell the property 
himself and avoid paying the agreed upon commission, while under the 
exclusive agency listing the owner can sell the property himself and 
avoid paying the agreed upon commission. T. 39, 40, 42, 126, 127, 
172, 546-549. 
32. Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of 
Utah, and according to Reed, the Listing constituted what is known as 
an exclusive right to sell listing, and was in the standard exclusive 
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right to sell listing form generally in use in the State of Utah in 
general, and by Reed in particular, at all times pertinent hereto. 
Ex. P-3, Appendix E, P-33; T. 45, 439, 448, 548, 549. 
33. Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of 
Utah, and according to Reed, there is no inconsistency between t~ 
60-40 Provision and an exclusive right to sell listing in the fo~~ 
the Listing. Ex. P-2, Appendix D, P-3, Appendix E, P-33; T. 436, 
553-555. 
34. According to Stevenson there was nothing in the Settle· 
ment Agreement or the Listing intended to be inconsistent with 
granting Appellant an exclusive right to sell listing with respect t: 
the Village Land, because: 
a. Prior to signing the Settlement Agreement and the 
Listing, even though Unionamerica wanted to sell the Villag1 
Land, Stevenson hadn't wanted Unionamerica to list the~~ 
lage Land with any broker because he wanted every licensed 
broker to be eligible to earn a full 6% commission, and he 
understood that once the Listing was given, Appellant wou!O 
be the only broker eligible for the full amount of such co1· 
mission, and the most a selling broker could earn would be 
60% of such commission. T. 285, 286, 292, 328, 359. 
b. Stevenson did not read the language in the listin~ 
which provides nr hereby grant you for the period of five 
years from date hereof the exclusive right to sell or 
exchange said property or any part thereof at the price~ 
terms stated hereon or such other price or term to whiclV 
may agree in writing." until after the subject sale had bee 
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consummated and a 6% commission had been earned, but Steven-
son nevertheless intended that Unionamerica be bound by the 
Listing. T. 303, 304. 
c. The 60-40 Provision was Stevenson's idea and he 
insisted on its inclusion in the Settlement Agreement, but 
the Settlement Agreement in general and the 60-40 Provision 
in particular are both silent on the subject of a walk-in, 
and nothing in the Settlement Agreement had anything to do 
with whether a walk-in would be referred. T. 291, 305. 
d. Prior to the signing of the Settlement Agreement it 
was orally agreed between Appellant and GPCC, that GPCC would 
refer any GPCC walk-in to Appellant, but if another broker 
"originated" the sale, then the 60-4G Provision would require 
Appellant and such other broker to split a 6% commission. T. 
202, 203, 210, 229. 
e. Such oral agreement was reached at the time of the 
signing of the Settlement Agreement when GPCC had Summit 
County properties it had not decided to sell, and with 
respect to which it did not give a listing that day, while 
Unionamerica was listing substantially all of its Summit 
County property with Appellant on the date of the Settlement 
Agreement, and therefore Unionamerica was not a party to the 
oral agreement with respect to a walk-in because Stevenson 
understood that the Listing as given to Appellant that same 
day protected Appellant with respect to the subject of the 
Appellant-GPCC oral agreement. T. 295, 300, 380, 381. 
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35. Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of 
Utah, the listing broker has an advantage over a potential selling 
broker with respect to any property about which they exchange notice! 
of listing or split commissions. These advantages include: 
a. The fact that the listing broker may put signs ~ 
the property with the listing broker's name, address and 
telephone number, while potential selling brokers are not 
permitted to put signs on any property listed with another 
broker. 
b. Usually the listing broker has better access to~ 
owner and the information helpful in making the sale because 
the owner has in fact selected the listing broker as his 
direct agent. 
c. Under an exclusive right to sell listing the listini• 
broker through the owner has access to any referrals from t~! 
owner. T. 176, 177. 
36. Pursuant to the custom and practice in the State of 
Utah, certain advantages are inherent to both the listing broker and 1 
selling broker in the use of an exclusive right to sell listing in 
conjunction with a multiple listing arrangement. Such advantages 
include: 
a. The selling broker becomes an agent of the listing 
broker and a sub-agent of tpe owner, and through the listing 
broker a selling broker has access to the money or other 
consider at ion the owner receives when the sale is completed. 
b. The listing broker gets paid for his promotional 
efforts, even though a selling broker consummates the sale. 
-16-
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c. The owner, as a result of the exclusive right to 
sell listing, is required to refer a walk-in to the listing 
broker. 
d. The listing broker can control the transaction or be 
what is called "a captain of the deal." As such the listing 
broker is designated by the owner as the owner's representa-
tive in the transaction, who looks out for the owner's 
interest, monitors the conduct of all of the potential 
selling brokers, and usually reviews any earnest money agree-
ment or offer which is presented, all in such a way that the 
potential selling brokers work through the listing broker. 
T. 127, 128, 563, 564. 
37. Pursuant to the custom and.practice in the State of 
Utah, under an exclusive right to sell listing, if none of the poten-
tial selling brokers rises to the level of being the procuring cause 
of the sale in question, the listing broker is entitled to keep all of 
any commission earned. T. 561. 
38. On May 15, 1978, a portion of the Village Land was con-
veyed by Unionamerica to Jack w. Davis, Inc., a corporation (the 
"Buyer") which corporation was wholly owned by its president Jack W. 
Davis ("Davis") and his family. As a result of such conveyance, there 
then became due and owing from Unionamerica to Appellant a sales 
commission of 6% of the $1,600,000 purchase price or $96,000 (the 
"Commission"). 11 26, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C1 Davis Dep. 8, 
36; see also the averments of ~ 13 of the Fourth Amended Complaint 
which averments were admitted by Unionamerica. 
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39. Appellant performed all services and discharged all 
obligations to be performed and discharged by it pursuant to the 
Listing. ~ 2, Memorandum Decision, Appendix B; ,I 1, Trial Court Co;. 
clusions, Appendix c. 
40. Before the Trial Court, Unionamerica and Stevenson cor· 
ceded that Unionamerica rather than PCR had "found" the Buyer with 
respect to the subject sale. T. 14, 18. 
41. Before the Trial Court, PCR, Reed and Cole conceded~ 
PCR, Reed and Cole were involved in the transaction as representati:o 
of the Buyer rather than acting for Unionamerica, which concession·• 
confirmed by Davis who testified that he wanted Reed to represent hi 
interests in Park City. ,I 22, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 
22; Davis Dep. 51. 
42. That PCR, Reed or Cole did not "find," "originate," 
"procure," or otherwise act as the agents of Appellant or sub-agent; 
of Unionamer ica with respect to the subject sale, is further confir:' 
by the following facts based upon the testimony of Stevenson, Re~, 
Cole, Davis (who was very antagonistic to Taylor. T. 259) and/or 
Robert Volk ("Volk") , the latter being the president and chief execc· 
tive officer of Unionamerica, Inc., a lawyer and former Commissione; 
of Corporations of the State of California: 
a. Sometime between September 1 and October 1, 1977 t 
first mention to the Buyer of the Village Land was made whe 
Gordon Luce ("Luce") , a member of the board of di rectors of 
Unionamerica, Inc., first told Davis about the Village Lani 
and its availability for purchase. Such mention was made 
at Lai during a face to face meeting between Luce and Davis 
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--
Tahoe, California, at which time Luce was well acquainted 
with Davis and already knew of Davis' credit worthiness 
because Luce managed a bank in San Diego, California, in 
which area Davis resided, and which bank financed some of 
Davis' business ventures. T. 88; Volk Dep. 18, 24; Davis 
Dep. 14. 
b. Sometime between September 1 and October 1, 1977, 
Volk spoke with Davis by telephone at whi_ch time Davis told 
Volk he was interested in purchasing the Village Land. ' 13, 
Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Volk Dep. 19, 21; Davis 
Dep. 15. 
c. Approximately two weeks prior to October 3, 1977, 
Stevenson learned from Volk about Davis' interest in the 
Village Land, but at that time Stevenson did not know Davis 
by name. ~ 14, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 321; 
Volk Dep. 20, 21. 
d. Sometime during that same period, Unionamerica sent 
Davis a feasibility study with respect to the future develop-
ment and anticipated economic returns on the Village Land 
(the "Feasibility Study"), which Feasibility Study disclosed 
Unionamerica's asking price for the Village Land of 
$1,600,000. Ex. P-5; Davis Dep. 18, 19. 
e. Shortly before October 3, 1977, Volk and Davis 
agreed by telephone to meet in Park City to inspect the Vil-
lage Land and discuss the Buyer's purchase thereof. Volk 
Dep. 19, 22; Davis Dep. 15. 
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f. On the morning of October 3, 1977 Volk ordered 
Stevenson to travel from Los Angeles, California to meet wi·. 
Volk and Davis and Davis' wife in Park City to discuss t~ 
subject sale and show Davis the Village Land. ~ 14, Tri~ 
Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 323. 
g. Thereafter that same morning, Stevenson called the 
offices of Appellant and asked for Taylor, whereupon he was 
told by Appellant's personnel that Taylor was in San Fran-
cisco, California and would not be back until later int~ 
week. During that same telephone conversation, Stevenson"' 
asked whether he would like to be put in touch with Taylor: 
San Francisco, but Stevenson declined such accommodation. :. 
the time of that same telephone conversation, Appellant had 
four licensed real estate salesmen in Park City, but dur~ 
such telephone conversation Stevenson did not ask to speak 
with any such salesmen about selling the Village Land even 
though he was personally acquainted with one of them. T. 
180' 187' 190-193' 324' 325. 
h. On the evening of October 3, 1977, Volk and Steven· 
son met at the Salt Lake City Airport whereupon Volk told 
Stevenson that Volk had to go to Los Angeles and that Stever 
son should go ahead and meet with Davis and Davis' wife as 
planned. ~ 15, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 325, 
326; Volk Dep. 22. 
i. At the time Volk left Stevenson in Salt Lake CiU 
that evening, Stevenson knew that the involvement of a 
selling broker other than Appellant in a sale of the Villa9 
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Land would obligate Appellant to split the Commission with 
such selling broker. Notwithstanding that fact, at no time 
after the morning of October 3, 1977 and prior to the execu-
tion on October 17, 1977 of the subject Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase (the "Earnest Money Agreement"), did 
Stevenson attempt to involve Appellant in the sale of the 
Village Land to the Buyer. T. 328-333. 
j. Prior to February 17, 1977 Unionamerica had listed 
certain of its real properties for sale with Reed as the 
listing broker, and prior to February 17, 1977 and at all 
times pertinent hereto Stevenson, Reed and Cole were close 
personal friends. T. 280, 281, 429. 
k. At all times pertinent hereto, PCR, Reed and Cole 
did not know the terms of the Settlement Agreement and the 
Listing, but did know that Appellant and Unionamerica had 
been in a lawsuit and as a result of that lawsuit Union-
america had listed the Village Land for sale with Appellant. 
~I 12, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 320, 340, 453. 
1. At the time Reed knew the Village Land had been 
listed to Appellant, the standard form in use in Park City 
was in the same form as the Listing, and at that same time 
Cole did not know of any form of listing other than the stan-
dard form listing granting an exclusive right to sell. T. 
394-397, 439, 448. 
m. Shortly after Appellant entered into the Settlement 
Agreement and the Listing, and several months prior to 
October 3, 1977, Taylor contacted Reed and requested the 
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assistance of Reed in selling the Village Land with the 
understanding that should PCR be the selling broker, PCR 
would be entitled to receive 60% of the Commission and 401 . 
the Commission would be retained by Appellant as the listin: 
broker. ~ 12, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C. 
n. As soon as Volk left Stevenson at the conclusion c' 
their airport meeting the evening of October 3, 1977, Steve· 
son took the lead in the anticipated transaction, and in 
spite of Cole's inexperience in real estate, he called Col! 
by telephone and arranged a face to face meeting with Reed 
and Cole at Cole's home that same evening. Stevenson thu 
traveled to Park City where he met with Reed and Cole at 
Cole's home, which meeting lasted from 10 to 15 minutes anc 
during which meeting Stevenson told Reed and Cole the ru~ 
that he was in town was to meet with Davis concerning Davi: 
interest in purchasing the Village Land. During that s~e 
conversation, Stevenson told Reed and Cole that he had tri! 
to reach Taylor with respect to the tr ans action, but Taylor 
was out of town. ~ 18, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; '. 
326, 327, 339, 340, 370, 393, 398, 452, 453; Volk Dep. 37, 
o. At no time after Reed and Cole learned of the pro:· 
pecti ve sale to the Buyer and that Taylor was out of town, 
did Cole attempt to cont~ct Taylor or any other personnel~­
Appellant, nor did Reed or Cole attempt to otherwise 
ascertain the details of the provisions of the Settlement 
Agreement or the Listing. T. 398-402, 409, 410. 
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P· Later that night of October 3, 1977, Stevenson met 
with Davis in Park City for 2 to 3 hours and the two of them 
discussed Park City in general and the Village Land and the 
Feasiblity Study in particular. Thereafter that same night, 
Stevenson arranged to have Reed and Cole meet with Stevenson 
and Davis and Davis' wife the following morning for break-
fast. ~ 16, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 341, 372. 
q. On October 4, 1977, such breakfast meeting occurred 
and was the first time Reed or Cole or any other agent or 
employee of PCR had met or had any involvement with Davis or 
the Buyer. Prior to this first involvement between Reed, 
Cole and Davis, Davis had already read the Feasibility 
Study. At such breakfast meeting, there was a general dis-
cussion about the merits of Park City and Davis' interest in 
the Village Land. ~ 19, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; T. 
402, 458; Davis Dep. 25-30. 
r. After such breakfast meeting, Davis, Davis' wife, 
Stevenson, Reed and Cole toured Park City together and ended 
the tour by viewing the Village Land on the afternoon of 
October 4, 1977, having further discussed the merits of Park 
City and the Village land. ~ 19, Trial Court Findings, 
Appendix C; Davis Dep. 30-32. 
s. Later that same afternoon, after Reed and Cole had 
left the group, Davis indicated to Stevenson the Buyer's 
definite interest in purchasing the Village Land. The sale 
to the Buyer was virtually made by then because by that time 
Davis was committ~d to purchasing the property and so far as 
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he was concerned it was an easy sale to make. T. 343; Davi; 
Dep. 74, 75. 
t. A few days after October 4, 1977, Davis called v01, 
on the telephone and orally agreed to the Buyer purchasi~ 
the Village Land at Unionamer ica' s asking pr ice, and Volk 
felt good about the Buyer's ability to purchase because of 
Luce's recommendation of Davis. After such telephone conver 
sation, Volk ordered Stevenson to follow through to make sur 
that the sale of the Village Land to the Buyer was consum-
mated. According to Volk, Volk "solicited Jack Davis into 
this company, by reason of my conversations with Gordon 
Luce." Volk Dep. 23-26, 35. 
u. On October 8, 1977, Cole wrote and mailed a lettn 
to Appellant purportedly to put Appellant on notice that 
Cole, representing PCR, had shown the Village Land to Davis 
and Davis' wife, which letter was received by Appellant wW 
in a few days after October 8, 1977. Nothing in this lett: 
disclosed to Appellant that Davis had been directed to PCR i 
Appellant's principal, Unionamerica. Ex. P-26; T. 66, 79, 
403, 404. 
v. On October 15, 1977, Reed sought out Taylor in Pui 
City and told Taylor that Reed had a buyer interested in 
purchasing the Village Land. Reed asked Taylor to orallY 
. 'c· 
confirm that there would be a 60%-40% split of the Comm1s 51 
if such a sale occurred, and Taylor gave such confirmati~· 
In spite of the fact that Taylor and Reed were both liceM~ 
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real estate brokers at the time, at no time during this Octo-
ber 15 meeting did Reed tell Taylor that Davis and the Buyer 
had been referred to Cole, Reed and PCR by Appellant's prin-
cipal, Unionamerica. ~I 23, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; 
T. 81, 88 I 462 I 464. 
w. On the morning of October 17, 1977, Reed and Cole 
met with Davis in San Diego, California at Davis' telephonic 
invitation and the three of them drafted the Earnest Money 
Agreement. Ex. P-9, D-27; Davis Dep. 33, 45, 46. 
x. That same morning, after drafting the Earnest Money 
Agreement, Reed called Stevenson in Los Angeles, California 
and after 5 minutes conversation Stevenson told Reed that 
Unionamerica would accept the Earnest Money Agreement as 
drafted. This was the first time Stevenson and Unionamerica 
had considered a sale of the Village Land pursuant to provi-
sions similar to the provisions of the Earnest Money Agree-
ment. T. 88, 332, 333, 345. 
y. That same morning Davis signed the Earnest Money 
Agreement on behalf of the Buyer and the Buyer paid the 
earnest money deposit required, whereupon Reed and Cole flew 
the Earnest Money Agreement to Los Angeles where Stevenson 
signed the Earnest Money Agreement on behalf of Unionamerica 
on the afternoon of October 17, 1977. ~ 21, Trial Court 
Findings, Appendix C; Ex. P-9, D-27; T. 346, 347, 466. 
z. on October 19, 1977, Reed personally delivered the 
fully executed Earnest Money Agreement to Taylor in Park 
City, whereupon Taylor asked Reed where PCR had found the 
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Buyer. According to Reed, he then did a "dumb" and "ridic·;. 
lous" thing, by intentionally misleading Taylor by stati~ 
implying that the Buyer had been found as a result of skii: 
in Park City. Such statement or implication was not tr~. 
Ex. P-17; T. 87, 98, 110, 463, 468-470. 
aa. On October 19 or 20, 1977 Reed told Cole that Ree' 
had intentionally misled Taylor about where Cole had fou~ 
the Buyer, but Cole did not take any action to tell Ta~ru 
that the true source of the Buyer was Appellant's principa:. 
Unionamerica. T. 415, 417. 
bb. Just prior to October 24, 1977, Stevenson, Davis, 
Reed and Cole met in Salt Lake City to war k out the details 
of a written real estate agreement pursuant to which Uniom-
amer i ca would sell the Village Land to the Buyer. Davis De: 
47, 48. 
cc. On October 24, 1977 Appellant notified all Respon· 
dents of Appellant's contention that Appellant was entitled 
to 100% of the Commission based upon Appellant's position 
that the Buyer had been referred by Unionamerica to Reed, 
Cole and PCR. Ex. P-10; T. 90. 
43. As of October 26, 1977, Unionamerica and the Buyer 
entered into a written real estate agreement (the "Real Estate A~& 
ment") pursuant to which the Village Land was sold to the Buyer Ml 
15, 1978 as aforesaid. Ex. P-12; T. 376; see also the averments cll 
13 of the Fourth Amended Complaint, which averments were admitted by 
Unionamerica. 
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44. Prior to June 10, 1977, Both Reed and Cole were involved 
in the preparation of the Feasibility Study and were aware of the 
future development and marketing possibilities of the Village Land 
over three months prior to meeting Davis. Ex. P-5; T. 317-319. 
45. Not only were Reed and Cole brought into the subject 
transaction to represent the interests of Davis and the Buyer, but 
such representation continued to the date of trial inasmuch as at that 
time: Reed was Davis' broker with respect to marketing the 144 condo-
minium units that had been or were in the process of being constructed 
on the Village Land; Reed and Cole were each given 5% of the profit 
from the development and sale of such condominiums; and Cole became an 
employee of the limited partnership which developed and was marketing 
such condominiums, and acted as a salesman of such condominiums. , 
25, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Ex. P-24; Davis Dep. 61-65. 
46. At the time Reed first met Davis, Reed wanted Davis for 
a client regardless of whether PCR earned a selling broker's commis-
sion based upon the sale of the Village Land to the Buyer, and Reed 
eventually got Davis as a client for Davis' future transactions in 
Park City. T. 456, 618. 
47. At all times pertinent hereto Appellant consistently 
took the position that Unionamerica owed Appellant 100% of the Commis-
sion. Ex. P-10, P-14; T. 90, 100-103, 473, 612. 
48. Prior to the suit being instituted, Unionamerica con-
ceded that its failure to pay 100% of the Commission to Appellant 
would constitute a breach of the Listing. Ex. P-13. 
49. Unionamerica, Stevenson, PCR and Reed consistently con-
ceded that Appellant was entitled to at least 40% of the Commission, 
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and at no time prior to suit being instituted herein did any Res~~ 
dent ever contend that Appellant was not entitled to at least 40%~ 
the Commission. Ex. P-12, P-13, P-17, P-32; T. 94, 104, llO, 350, 
351, 419, 583, 584. 
SO. Notwithstanding the foregoing conssessions, upon the 
Commission being earned and in response to Unionamerica' s inquiry, 
Reed refused to agree to Unionamer ica paying even 40% of the Commis-
sion to Appellant because in Reed's words, "that wouldn't be very 
smart," because Appellant would "have nothing he could gain by ever 
settling II T. 477, 478. 
51. The Earnest Money Agreement provides at lines 49 and 1: 
as follows: 
The seller agrees in consideration of the efforts 
of the agent in procuring a purchaser to pay said 
agent a commission of 6% of the sale price. In 
the event seller has entered into a listing con-
tract with any other agent and said contract is 
presently effective, this paragraph will be of no 
force or effect. 
,I 20, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; Ex. P-9, D-27. 
52. Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions and Appellant' 
demands to the contrary, upon the Commission being earned counsel for 
Unionamerica insisted on Unionamerica not paying any of the Commissic 
directly to Appellant, and Unionamer ica took such position in spite c 
the custom and practice in the State of Utah that a split of any Corn· 
mission does not involve the owner but is solely an issue between thi 
listing broker and the selling broker. T. 418, 570, 571. 
53. On May 17, 1978 Unionamerica deposited the Commission:· 
escrow with Summit County Title Company (the "Escrow Holder"). ,I 26 · 
Trial Court Findings, Appendix C. 
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54. The Listing required Unionamerica to pay to Appellant 
reasonable attorneys' fees and all costs of collection as a result of 
unionamerica's failure to pay the Commission to Appellant, and Appel-
lant incurred reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of collection in an 
amount not determined by the Trial Court. ~ 1, Judgment, Appendix D; 
EX P-3. 
55. On June 23, 1978, Unionamerica without the assitance of 
a real estate broker sold certain of its real property located in 
summit County (the "Davis Property") to Davis for a total purchase 
price of $42,500, and pursuant to the Settlement Agreement on that 
date there became due and owing to Appellant from Unionamerica a sales 
commission of 6% of said purchase price or $2,550. ~ 5, Memorandum 
Decision, Appendix B; ~ 29, Trial Court Findings, Appendix C; t 7, 
Trial Court Conclusions, Appendix C. 
56. Unionamerica failed to notify Appellant of its intention 
to sell the Davis Property and failed to enter into an exclusive 
listing agreement with Appellant as contemplated by the Settlement 
Agreement. ~ 5, Memorandum Decision; Ex. P-16; T. 112, 113. 
57. Pursuant to the provisions of the Settlement Agreement 
and the contemplated written exclusive listing agreement with respect 
to the Davis Property, Appellant is entitled to recover from Union-
america Appellant's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs of collection 
incurred with respect to collecting the $2,550 due and owing to Appel-
lant, but the reasonable amount of said attorneys' fees and costs of 
collection were not determined by the Trial Court. ! 5, Memorandum 
Decision, Appendix B; ~ 1, Judgment, Appendix D; Ex. P-2, Appendix E, 
P-3, Appendix F. 
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58. Volk never saw either the Settlement Agreement or the 
Listing prior to the time his deposition was taken on November a, 
1979, which was nearly three years after such written instruments~ 
been entered into, and nearly a year and one-half after the subject 
lawsuit had been started. Until after the lawsuit was started, Vo!i 
didn't even know such agreements existed, except he did have a vague 
understanding that the previous lawsuit had been settled. When Vo!i 
found out that Taylor was making some claim based upon such agre~ 
ments, he was shocked. Volk Dep. 9, 10, 28-30. 
59. Notwithstanding the fact that Volk knew nothing a~~ 
the Settlement Agreement and the Listing until after the suit was 
started, and notwithstanding the fact that Volk never even looked at 
the language of the Settlement Agreement or the Listing until ne~~· 
year and one-half after the suit was started, when told by Stevenson 
that the suit had been started, Volk's reaction was "well to hell wi·. 
Mr. Taylor," or words to that effect. Volk Dep. 32, 33. 
60. The Trial Court refused to admit into evidence the~ 
spring 1979 issue of Volume 3 of "Utah Real Estate News," the officio 
publication of the Real Estate Division of the Department of Businei0 
Regulations of the State of Utah, which issue in an article entitlec 
"Listing and Selling Brokers' Relationship" on page 2 thereof (t~ 
"Real Estate Division Article") according to the director of the Rea: 
Estate Division described Utah real estate industry customs and prac· 
tices as to the rights and duties between listing and selling broke!' 
and which description had been approved by the state's Board of Real 
Estate Examiners. The customs and practices described in the Real 
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Estate Division Article were in effect at all times pertinent to this 
iawsuit. Ex. P-30; T. 520-529. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PCR A SELLING BROKER'S 
COMMISSION. 
A. THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH THAT PCR WAS 
THE PROCURING CAUSE OF THE SUBJECT SALE. 
1. The Trial Court's determination. 
The Memorandum Decision is silent with respect to any speci-
fic finding or conclusion on the issue of whether PCR was the procuring 
cause of the subject sale. However, at ' 27, Trial Court Findings, 
Appendix c, it is said that PCR "by and through its agents, Reed and 
Cole, fully performed the obligations of a selling broker under the 
fee splitting agreement reached between plaintiffs" and PCR. That is 
as close as the Trial Court came to revealing any criteria by which 
PCR's sales efforts were measured. On the other hand, Judge Croft's 
Order held that a person or entity other than Appellant or Union-
america would be entitled to a split of the Commission if such other 
person or entity were to both "find" and "negotiate" a sale of the 
property. Judge Croft's Order further held that it was to be the law 
of the case on such issue. See Judge Croft's Order, Appendix A. 
2. The law and its application to the uncontroverted facts. 
Appellant contends that the evidence in the record precludes 
a11 reasonable basis in fact which can reasonably support the Trial 
Court's decision. 
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An understanding of the type of listing given Appellant, it, 
use in conjunction with a multiple listing arrangement and the 
resulting relationships between Appellant, Unionamerica and PCR, is 
important to our discussion of whether PCR was the procuring cauh~ 
the subject sale. 
Pursuant to the Listing, Unionamerica agreed as follows: 
In consideration of your agreement to list the 
property described above, and to use reasonable 
efforts to find a purchaser therefor, I hereby 
grant you for the period of five years from date 
hereof the exclusive right to sell or exchange 
said propety or any part thereof . . . . 
If said property or any part thereof is sold or 
exchanged during said term by myself or any other 
person, firm or corporation, I agree to pay you a 
commission . . . (emphasis added) 
It is elementary that the Listing is of a type known as M 
"exclusive right to sell listing." See ~~ 31 - 34, Statement of 
Facts; 88 A.L.R.2d 936 § 10; 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers §§ 226, 227; Folz 
v. Begnoche, 222 Ka. 383, 565 P.2d 592 (1977); Carlsen v. Zane, 67 
Cal. Rptr. 747 (1968); Patterson v. Blair, 123 Utah 216, 257 P.2d 9~1 
(1953). Although Appellant agreed to allow other brokers to partici· 
pate and share in the Commission, this did not in any way abrogate tt 
exclusive right to sell granted by the Listing. Rather, the 60-40 
Provision was dependent upon and could become operative only through 
the Listing as such other brokers became agents of Appellant and n~ 
agents of Unionamerica. By guaranteeing to Appellant as the listing 
broker a portion of the Commission, Appellant was protected as to th' 
portion of the Commission corresponding to the effort necessary to 
obtain the Listing and perform the duties of a listing broker. The 
remaining effort required to accomplish the purpose of the Settlemen 
_,.,_ 
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Agreement and the Listing, that being the procurement of a buyer, was 
to be compensated by that portion of the Commission reserved for a 
selling broker, and all licensed brokers could compete for such por-
tion. Pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and the Listing, and the 
custom and practice in the real estate industry, if Appellant or 
unionamerica procured the sale, then Appellant would be entitled to 
retain all of the Commission. See White v. Ragel, 82 N.M. 644, 485 
P.2d 978 (1971); Carlsen v. Zane, 67 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1968). 
Because of the "exclusive" nature of the Listing, to earn the 
60% portion of the Commission, it is well settled that PCR had to act 
as an agent of Appellant and as a sub-agent of Unionamerica. See 45 
A.L.R.3d 190; Frisell v. Newman, 71 Wa.2d 520, 429 P.2d 864 (1967); 71 
A.L.R. 3d 586 § 21 et. seq. 
An excellent discussion of this same proposition and the 
duties and obligations of listing and selling brokers with respect to 
each other may be found in the Real Estate Division Article as pub-
lished and approved by the Utah Board of Real Estate Examiners as 
follows: 
The selling broker, as the sub-agent of the 
listing broker, is an agent of two principals -
the listing broker, who is his immediate princi-
pal, and the listing broker's principal. As a 
sub-agent, the selling broker owes an agent's duty 
to both of his principals, and that duty is one of 
utmost loyalty. This duty requires the selling 
broker to exercise good faith, professional skill, 
and diligence pursuant to the listing broker's 
instructions as each fulfills his respective obli-
gations to their mutual principal. This duty 
further requires the selling broker to disclose 
immediately to the listing broker all ~aterial and 
pertinent facts which concern transactions on 
behalf of their principal. This duty does not 
terminate upon the execution of a contract, but 
continues until the termination of the sub-agency. 
-33-
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The selling broker's failure to discharge this 
duty to his principals would be a breach of the 
fiduciary relationship, which in turn would sub-
ject him to liability for any harm which befalls 
the listing broker or the principal by reason of 
the breach. Since the listing broker is the only 
party with full knowledge of the seller's instruc-
tions and the seller's needs, it is imperative 
that the selling broker follow the instructions of 
the listing broker at all times, and to immedia-
tely inform the listing broker of all material and 
pertinent facts which concern the transaction. 
Generally, it is assumed that the agreement 
between listing broker (principal) and selling 
broker (agent), subject to any agreement to the 
contrary, requires the listing broker to pay the 
selling broker, in the event the selling broker is 
the procuring cause to a sale, provided the sale 
is consummated and/or a commission is paid to the 
listing broker. Any claim for an earned commis-
sion by the selling broker should be made against 
the listing broker. 
Page 2, Ex. P-30, which exhibit the Trial Court did not admit in~ 
evidence. 
As the foregoing makes clear, whether PCR is entitled to 
collect a portion of the Commission from Appellant depends on whethe1 
PCR was the procuring cause of the sale to the Buyer. To make that 
decision we are concerned with how procuring cause is determined. 
survey of the various jurisdictions, including Utah, reveals four 
different tests utilized by the courts to determine what constitutes 
procuring cause: 
a. Finding the Purchaser. 
Our Supreme Court in Frederick May v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 
368 P.2d 266 (1962), in the process of holding that the broker hadnc 
exclusive right to sell listing with respect to the sale of corporate 
stock, held that entitlement to a brokerage commission depended on 
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whether the broker was the "procuring cause" of the sale. It was 
there said: 
The cases use many different words in conjunction 
with, or in place of, the words, "procuring cause" 
to indicate the necessary extent the broker must 
induce the sale in order to be entitled to a com-
mission, such as "proximate cause," "actuating 
cause," "moving cause" and the like: all meaning 
about the same thing. However, the extent to 
which the broker's efforts must induce the sale 
depends on the terms used in the contract and the 
understanding and intention of the parties in 
making such agreement and the facts and circum-
stances of the case. Usually, whether the broker 
first approaches, or brings to the attention of 
the buyer that the property is for sale, or brings 
the bu er into the icture, has considerable 
weight in determining whether the buyer sic] is 
the procuring cause of the sale. (emphasis added) 
Other courts have used synonymous language in applying or describing 
this test, to-wit: 
"procuring cause" refers to efforts of a realtor 
in introducing, producing, finding or interesting 
a purchaser • • • • (emphasis added). Harkey v. 
Gahagan, 338 So.2d 133, La. App.2d Cir. (1976). 
To be the "procuring cause" of a sale of real 
estate, the broker must show that he called the 
potential purchaser's attention to the property • 
. . • Dixson v. Kattel, 331 So.2d 827, Fla. App. 
(1975). 
. . • where the sale is traced to his introduction 
of purchaser to owner or principal. Wilson v. 
Sewell, 50 N.M. 121, 171 P.2d 647 (1946) • 
. . • where broker brings parties together .• 
Jones v. Torrance, 141 S.W.2d 1007, Tex. Civ. 
App. (1940). 
the original discovery of the purchaser • 
ware v. DosPassos, 38 N.Y.S. 673 (1896). 
ti b, Initiation of Negotiations. 
Most courts require that at the very least the broker 
claiming a commission must have initiated the negotiations which 
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result in the sale generating the commission. See for example ~ 
v. Tapley, Ok. , 329 P.2d 672 (1958); and Dixson v. Kattel , 
supra. 
c. But for Causation. 
Some courts have applied the traditional negligence test 
respect to causation in determining whether a broker has been the 
procuring cause of a sale. That is, can it be said that "but for' 
efforts of the broker, there would have been no sale to the eventu 
purchaser. See for example Kadane v. Clark, 134 S.W.2d 448, Tex. 
App. (1939); J-BMotors v. Margolis, 75 Ariz. 392, 257 P.2d 588 
(1953); Corbitt v. Robinson, 53 So.2d 259, La. App. (1951); and Ma 
shall v. White, 245 F. Supp. 514 (D.C.N.C. 1965). 
d. Efficient Cause. 
Several courts have equated procuring cause with what is 
described as the efficient cause of the sale. In practical applic 
tion there appears to be no difference between the conduct require 
this test and any of the other tests mentioned. See for example 
Hayden v. Ashley, 86 wa. 653, 150 P. 1147 (1915); and Neumeier v. 
Sourzel, 223 Minn. 60, 25 N.W.2d 651 (1946). 
In summary, a reading of the authorities makes it clear t 
a licensed selling broker claiming a real estate commission must, 
minimum, either find the buyer or initiate negotiations which lead 
the sale generating the commission. According to Judge Croft's Or 
such broker must both 11 find" and "negotiate. 11 With respect to the 
instant case the question then becomes did PCR find the buyer and/ 
commence negotiations to thus rise to the level of being the procu 
cause of the subject sale. A detailed examination of the facts in 
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: i~: 
record clearly indicates that PCR was not the procuring cause of the 
subject sale regardless of which test is applied. PCR's involvement 
was after the fact, tangential and relatively superficial, and it 
cannot be seriously questioned that such belated involvement was the 
result of Stevenson's effort to reward his personal friends, Reed and 
Cole. The chronology of the events as set forth in the table below 
demonstrates that the involvement of PCR was relatively insignificant: 
1. September, 1977. 
Initial contact between 
Onionamerica and the 
Buyer with respect to 
the Village Land. 
Involvement of Unionamerica 
(Luce, Volk & Stevenson) 
Initial contact made bet-
ween Luce, a member of the 
Board of Directors of 
Unionamerica, Inc., and 
Davis, the principal owner 
of the Buyer. ~ 42 a, 
Statement of Facts. 
Involvement of PC 
(Reed and Cole) 
Not present and not 
involved. 
? 
2. September, 1977. 
Initial contact between 
Volk, the president of 
Onionamerica, Inc., and 
Davis. 
Luce, as a "mutual 
acquaintance" of both Volk 
and Luce brought them to-
gether by telephone. 
Not present and not J 
involved. 
3. September, 1977. 
Second contact between 
Onionamer ica and the 
Buyer. 
4. September, 1977. 
Prequalification of 
credit worthiness of 
the Buyer. 
' 42 a, b, Statement of 
Facts. 
. ' 
Consists of l or 2 tele-
phone conversations bet-
ween Volk and Davis during 
which Davis declares his 
interest in purchasing the 
Village Land. ~ 42 b, e, 
Statement of Facts. 
Not present and not 
involved. 
Luce was well acquainted 
with Davis' credit worthi-
ness because Luce managed 
a financial institution 
which had historically 
financed Davis' enterprises, 
and Volk was comfortable 
with the Buyer because of 
Luce's recommendation. 
~ 42 a, Statement of Facts. 
-37-
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5. September or prior 
to October 3, 1977. 
Initial furnishing of 
written materials to 
the Buyer extolling the 
virtues of the Village 
Land. 
6. September or prior 
to October 3, 1977. 
Agreement to have repre-
sentatives of Union-
america and the Buyer 
meet to discuss the 
sales transaction and 
physically inspect the 
Village Land. 
7. October 3, 1977. 
More pronounced interest 
in acquiring the Village 
Land as Davis and his 
wife travel from San 
Diego, California to 
meet with represent-
atives of Unionamerica 
to discuss the subject 
transaction and physi-
cally inspect the 
Village Land. 
8. October 3, 1977. 
Initial meeting in Park 
City between representa-
tives of Unionamerica 
and the Buyer. 
9. Sometime Prior to 
October 4, 1977. Davis 
read the Feasibility 
Study. ~ 42 q, State-
ment of Facts. 
The Feasibility Study, 
containing a detailed ana-
lysis of the potential 
uses and value of the Vil-
lage land, which value was 
stated to be the eventual 
selling price of $1,600,000, 
was sent by Unionamerica 
and received by Davis. 
~ 42 d, Statement of Facts. 
Volk and Davis telephon-
ically agreed to meet in 
Park City, Utah which 
meeting would require the 
participants therein to 
come to Park City from out 
of State. ~ 42 e, State-
ment of Facts 
Both Volk and Stevenson 
travel to Salt Lake City, 
but only Stevenson travels 
to Park City to meet with 
Davis and his wife. ~ 42 
h, Statement of Facts. 
Stevenson spends 2 to 3 
hours discussing the sub-
ject transaction with 
Davis including discussing 
the merits of Park City in 
general, and the Feasibi-
lity Study and the uses 
of the Village Land in 
particular. ~ 42 p, State-
ment of Facts. 
Not present and not 
involved. 
-38-
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10. Morning of October 
4 1977. Breakfast 
m~eting in Park City 
between representatives 
of unionamer ica, the 
Buyer and PCR. 
11. October 4, 1977. 
Representatives of 
unionamerica, the Buyer 
and PCR tour Park City 
and physically inspect 
the Village Land. 
12. Later afternoon of 
October 4, 1977. 
Meeting between repre-
sentative of Union-
amer ica and the Buyer 
following the physcial 
inspection of the 
Village Land. 
13. Sometime between 
October 4, and October 
17, 1977. Oral confir-
mation to Unionamerica 
by the Buyer of the 
nc• Buyer's desire to pur-
chase the Village Land. 
14. Between October 8, 
and October 17, 1977. 
Representatives of PCR 
and the Buyer arrange to 
meet in San Diego. 
15. Morning of October 
17, 1977. Drafting and 
the Buyer's signing of 
the Earnest Money Agree-
ment. 
Stevenson, who had autho-
rity to sell, negotiate 
terms, price etc. was pre-
sent representing Union-
amer ica. ' 42 p, q, 
Statement of Facts. 
Stevenson present the 
entire time. ' 42 r, 
Statement of Facts. 
Stevenson and Davis dis-
cussed the subject trans-
action alone, at which 
time Davis indicated his 
definite interest in 
aquiring the property be-
cause by this time he was 
committeed to such acquisi-
tion and as to him it was 
a very easy sale to make. 
' 42 s, Statement of Facts. 
Davis telephonically 
advised Volk that he 
wished to purchase the 
Village Land at Union-
amer ica' s asking price 
of $1,600,000, leading 
Volk to later say that 
Volk "solicitated Davis 
into this company." ' 
42 t, Statement of Facts. 
Not present and not 
involved. 
Stevenson telephonically 
discussed with Reed for 5 
minutes the details of the 
Earnest Money Agreement. 
' 42 x, Statement of 
Facts. 
-39-
l 
Both Reed and Cole · I 
were present and th I' 
was their first in- . 
volvement. Accor di 1 
to Reed, Davis 
already knew a lot 
about the Village 
Land. ' 42, p, q, 
Statement of Facts. 
Reed and Cole prese 
the entire time. 
' 42 4, Statement o 
Facts. 
Not present and not 
involved. 
Not present and not I 
involved. 
Reed, Cole and Davi 
telephonically 
arrange the meeting: 
' 42 w, Statement c 
Facts. 
Reed, Cole and Davi 
drafted the Earnest 
Money Agreement. 
' 42 x, Statement c 
Facts. 
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16. Afternoon of Octo-
ber 17, 1977. Signing 
of the Earnest Money 
Agreement by Union-
Amer ica. 
17. On or about Octo-
ber 22 through October 
24, 1977. Represent-
atives of Unionamerica, 
the Buyer and PCR 
meeting in Salt Lake 
City to prepare the 
Real Estate Agreement, 
which Unionamerica and 
the Buyer execute on 
October 24, 1977. 
Stevenson signed the 
Earnest Money Agreement on 
behalf of Unionamerica. 
~ 42 y, Statement of 
Facts. 
Stevenson represented and 
signed the Real Estate 
Agreement on behalf of 
Unionamerica. ~ 43, 
Statement of Facts. 
Reed and Cole . 
carried the E' 
•11 Money Agreemen! 
San Diego to~· 
Angeles and pr; 
same to Stevem 
~f 42 y, Staten: 
Facts. · 
Reed and Cole 1 
involved throu1 
n 42 bb, 43,i 
ment of Facts, 
Of the 17 chronological events listed in the foregoing t~k 
note that PCR was involved on only 6 occasions, and on only 1 of tho:' 
occasions was PCR invo1~1ed without Unionamerica also being involved, 1 
Note also that any such involvement on the part of PCR came very lat! 
in the history of the transaction, AFTER Unionamer ica had both found 
and initiated substantial negotiations. It is also telling that even 
after Cole and Reed first became involved with the Buyer on the mar· 
ning of October 4, 1977, Davis didn't tell them he intended to buy U1 
property until after he had told Stevenson he wanted to buy and ~U 
Volk that he would buy at Unionamerica's asking price. 
Since Judge Croft's Order listed the appropriate tests for 
determining procuring cause in terms of the conjunctive "find" a~ 
"negotiate;" and since Judge Croft's Order with respect to those~~ 
is consistent with the authorities cited herein; and since Judge 
Croft• s Order expressly stated that it was the law of the case; and 
since the Trial Court considered itself bound and expressly decidedt 
-40-
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follow Judge Croft's Order; and in light of Unionamerica's admission 
that Unionamerica found the Buyer, which admission is entirely consis-
tent with the facts as recited above; and in light of PCR's admission 
that PCR was involved in the transaction to represent the interests of 
the Buyer, which admission is entirely consistent with the facts as 
recited above; we submit there is no evidence in the record to support 
the Trial Court's determination that PCR was the procuring cause of 
the subject sale. 
B. PCR WAS NOT A LICENSED BROKER, THEREFORE LACKED CAPACITY 
TO SUE, AND THEREFORE PCR'S COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
1. The Trial Court's determination. 
The Trial Court's determination on the issue of whether PCR 
was a licensed real estate broker is most broadly stated in ' S, Trial 
Court Findings, which reads as follows: 
tions. 
Defendant PCR, Inc. dba Skyline Realty (Skyline) 
is a Utah corporation having its principal place 
of business in Summit County and was a licensed 
real estate broker at all times material to the 
issues of this case. (emphasis added) 
The Trial Court made two other related specific determina-
At ~ 28, Trial Court Findings it provides: 
The court finds that any defense as to the lack of 
capacity by the defendant Park City Reservations, 
Inc. to maintain this action should have been . 
pleaded in plaintiffs' answer to the counterclaim 
asserted by Park City Reservations, Inc., or, at 
the very least prior to trial. Although the 
plaintiffs had
1
knowledge of the facts upon which 
they based the defense as to lack of capacity, 
such defense was not raised until trial was almost 
complete. 
At I 10, Trial Court Conclusions, the Trial Court held: 
-41-
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By virtue of plaintiffs' failure to timely raise 
the defense of lack of capacity to maintain this 
ac~ion, the court finds that any such defense was 
waived by the plaintiffs. The court further finds 
that any such defense must fail because at all 
times pertinent to this action the defendant Harry 
F. Reed was a broker licensed by the State of Utah 
and was operating on behalf of Park City Reserva-
tions, Inc. dba Skyline Realty. 
There is nothing in the Memorandum Decision on the subject of , 28, 
Trial Court Findings or ~ 10, Trial Court Conclusions. 
2. The uncontroverted facts establishing that PCR was unli· 
censed. 
It is Appellant's contention that the evidence in the recori' 
I 
I 
precludes all reasonable basis in fact which can reasonably support 
the Trial Court's finding that PCR was a licensed real estate broker.I 
~ 
Such contention is supported by n 4 - 7, Statement. of Facts, which 
indisputable facts are summarized here as follows: 
a. Exhibits P-45, P-46, P-47, P-48 and P-49 clearly indicad 
that Ladd E. Christensen as an individual doing business under the . 
name Skyline Realty and Investment Company was the broker under whom 
Reed was licensed as a broker/branch manager between December 1976~ 
July 1978. Further, on or about July 1978 Reed as an individual~~ 
business as Skyline Land Company became his own broker and was no 
longer a licensed real estate salesman under Christensen. According!: 
between the time the Settlement Agreement and Listing were entered · 
into and the subject sales. transaction closed and the Commission was 
earned, Reed was not the primary real estate broker for any individua: 
or entity but at most was a broker/branch manager for his broker 
Christensen. 
-42-
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b. At trial, Reed himself testified that he knew of no docu-
ment whatsoever that would establish that he at anytime was ever a 
broker for PCR. 
c. It is no wonder then that PCR is not even mentioned in 
any of the records maintained by the Real Estate Division of the Utah 
state Department of Business Regulations. Based upon a diligent 
search of such records, Steven J. Francis, the Director of said divi-
sion certified to the Trial Court that: 
[N]o record or entry is found to exist in 
the records of said office showing that Park City 
Reservations, Inc., whether as a corporation, 
partnership, association, sole proprietorship or 
any other entity is or ever has been a licensed 
real estate broker or broker company in the State 
of Utah, and that ••. no record of entry is 
found to exist in the records showing that Harry 
F. Reed is or ever has been a licensed real estate 
broker authorized to act as such broker for any 
corporation, partnership, association, sole pro-
prietorship or any other entity known and desig-
nated as Park City Reservations, Inc. Ex. P-34. 
(emphasis added) 
d. Please note that no where in the record is there any 
indication that Reed ever acted as a broker for any corporation. Be 
acted as a broker/branch manager under Christensen doing business in 
Christensen's individual capacity, and thereafter Reed acted as his 
own broker doing business in Reed's own individual capacity as Skyline 
Land Company. This is entirely consistent with the fact that about 
the same time Reed began acting as his own broker, in his individual 
capacity he filed an assumed name certificate with the Secretary of 
State of the State of Utah to transact his business under the assumed 
name Skyline Land company, which is the same name in which he was 
doing business as an individual as a real estate broker beginning in 
-43-
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July of 1978. This was after the subject transaction was conplet~. 
Ex. P. 51. 
3. The law and its application to the foregoing facts, 
According to subsection 61-2-18(a) of the License Law: 
No ••• corporation shall bring or maintain an 
action in any court of this state for the recovery 
of commission, a fee, or compensation for any act 
done or service rendered, the doing or rendering 
of which is prohibited under the provisions of 
this act other than licensed real estate brokers 
unless such person was duly licensed hereunder as 
a real estate broker at the time of the doing of 
such act or the rendering of such service. 
(emphasis added) 
Pursuant to the provisions of Sections 61-2-1, 61-2-2 and 61-2-9(c), 
the License Law, the corporation, PCR, was clearly acting as a "real 
estate broker" within the meaning of Section 61-2-2 and had to have: 
license as required by Section 61-2-1. 
The authorities are in complete accord with the proposition 
that subsection 61-1-18 (a) quoted above means exactly what it says. 
Under such legislative prohibition, as a general proposition •it goe> 
almost without saying . • • a broker is without right to recover com· 
pensation for his services per formed while he was unlicensed." 12 Al 
Jur.2d Brokers § 178. See also the cases collected in 169 A.L.R. ~ 
at page 775. More specifically the same proposition holds true with 
respect to situations where one broker sues another broker as in the 
case at bar. In Stanson v. McDonald, 147 Oh. 191, 70 N.E.2d 359, HI 
A.L.R. 760 (1946) the court applied a statute similar to our own toa 
situation where the plaintiff was licensed when negotiations began, 
but was unlicensed when the real estate commission was earned. The 
Ohio court held that there could be no recovery against a co-broker r· 
-44-
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a fee splitting contract because of the plaintiff's unlicensed 
status. In so holding, the court stated that when the legislature 
"has said there is no right of action, courts are without authority to 
create one and thus defy the law of the state." 169 A. L.R. 764. More 
recently in Wheaton v. Ramsey, 92 Idaho 33, 436 P.2d 248 (1968) the 
Idaho Supreme Court construing the Montana real estate licensing 
statute held that "no matter what hardships it may work or how strong 
equities appear, a fee splitting agreement between brokers is 
unenforceable by an unlicensed broker. n 
Our own court has also ruled that a claimant seeking to 
recover for services tantamount to the services of a real estate 
broker cannot maintain an action to collect a commission if the 
claimant is unlicensed. Diversified General Corp. v. White Barn Golf 
Course, Inc., Utah, 584 P.2d 848 (1978). 
It is important to note that there is no inconsistency 
between the conclusions reached by the foregoing authorities and this 
court's 1980 decision in Global Recreation, Inc. v. Cedar Hills 
Development Co., Utah, 614 P.2d 155 (1980). In that case the 
unlicensed corporate plaintiff had an exclusive right to sell 
defendant's properties pursuant to a marketing agreement. However, 
the individual plaintiff Hendricks was a licensed real estate broker 
and the individual plaintiff Snarr was a licensed real estate salesman 
under the .defendant licensed corporate broker, albeit Snarr was paid 
by the unlicensed corporate plaintiff. The court held that plaintiffs 
i could recover the contested commission because Snarr could sue his own 
corporate broker with whom Snarr was "connected" and with whom Snarr 
had a "valid broker-salesman relationship," and also because the 
-45-
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exclusive sales contract entitled the unlicensed corporate plaintiff 
to a "commission on a sale consummated by a licensed salesman." In 
the case at bar the situation is different because we don't have a 
licensed salesman suing his own broker as permitted by Subsection 
61-2-18(b) of the License Law. This is not a Subsection 18(b) can, 
Instead, because there is no licensed claimant in the present case,, 
have under consideration a situation where Subsection 18 (a) applies, 
Here, pursuant to the only counterclaim pled, the unlicensed corpmt 
ti on, PCR, is the only claimant. Reed and Cole are not even parties 
to the counterclaim. Accordingly, based upon the plain language of 
Subsection 61-2-18(a), since PCR was not licensed, PCR may not·~~ 
or maintain" its counterclaim. 
The legal disability incurred by PCR as a result of its u~ 
licensed status is commonly referred to as a "lack of capacity to su! 
which disability deprives a party of the right to come into court. 
The legal capacity to sue is essential to being a proper party plain· 
tiff which status in turn is essential to confer jurisdiction on t~ 
court. 59 Am. Jur.2d Parties §§ 20, 31. 
The foregoing propositions are consistent with Art. 8, § 7o 
the Utah State Constitution and Section 78-3-4 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953) both of which provide: 
The district court shall have original jurisdic-
tion in all matters civil and criminal not 
excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by 
law; • . • . (emphasis added) 
In light of the quoted language, as soon as it becomes apparent that 
an unlicensed claimant is seeking to recover for services as a re~ 
-46-
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estate broker then the court no longer has jurisdiction over the sub-
ject matter of the claim. Such a conclusion is no different than 
those reached in the numerous federal court cases in which claims have 
been dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction when, during 
the course of the proceedings, it becomes apparent that there is 
little likelihood that the claimant can recover the federal juris-
dictional amount. See the cases collected in Moore's Federal 
Practice, Volume 2A, § 1207 (2] fn 8 at page 2254. 
4. The Trial Court erred in determining that Appellant had 
waived its rights predicated upon PCR's lack of capacity to sue. 
As noted above, although the Memorandum Decision was silent 
on the issue of waiver being discussed here, ~ 10, Trial Court Con-
clusions determined there was such a waiver. Of course, such 
conclusion is inconsistent with the Trial Court's express determina-
tion in said ~ 10 that PCR was in fact a licensed corporate real 
estate broker through Reed, and the very fact that opposing counsel 
and the Trial Court found it necessary to adopt such a conclusion 
casts fatal aspersions on the Trial Court's decision that PCR was 
licensed. Nonetheless, the Trial Court's determination as to waiver 
is equally erroneous as appears from the following discussion. 
In reliance on Crockett's and Reed's direct representations 
to the contrary, as established by the facts recited in ~! 11, 12, 16, 
Statement of Facts, Appellant's counsel did not discover PCR's lack of 
capacity to sue until just prior to trial at which time said counsel 
was precluded from using further pre-trial motions by District Court 
Rule 10. Then, when the issue was raised at trial, the court 
expressly held that Respondents had not been unduly surprised by 
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Appellant's evidence of lack of capacity. Thereafter, it was not 
until the conclusion of Appellant's opening argument that any cont er. 
tion was made that Appellant had waived the effect of PCR's lack of 
capacity. 
It seems unbelievable that Crockett and Reed could mislead 
counsel for Appellant, as was done in this case, and then claim that 
Appellant waived the effect of the true facts because they were not 
brought out until the time of trial, when the reason they were not 
brought out until the time of trial was because of District Court~ 
10. 
Even if it can be said that the defense of lack of capacity 
to sue was waived as belatedly contended by PCR, such lack of capa· 
city was not waived as to Appellant's cause of action for a declara· 
tory judgment determining that PCR was not entitled to recover from 
Appellant any part of the Commission. See Count XIII of Appellant's 
Fourth Amended Complaint. Further, according to Section 61-2-1 of tt' 
License Law, it was unlawful for PCR to act as a real estate broker a: 
was done in this case "without first obtaining a license." Since 
Appellant pled "illegality" as an affirmative defense to PCR's coun· 
terclaim, PCR's lack of capacity to sue based on PCR's unlicensed ano 
therefore illegal conduct, was not waived but rather was expressly 
preserved as a justiciable issue. See Appellant's replies to each 
counterclaim pled by PCR. 
Further, with respect to the issue of waiver, it is elemen· 
tary that subject matter jurisdiction may be contested at any time, 
even on appeal. 
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C. PCR CONDUCTED ITS BUSINESS AND PROSECUTED ITS COUNTERCLAIM 
UNDER AN ASSUMED NAME WITHOUT HAVING FILED A CERTIFICATE OF 
ASSUMED NAME, THEREFORE PCR LACKED CAPACITY TO SUE, AND 
THEREFORE PCR'S COUNTERCLAIM SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED FOR 
LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION. 
1. The Trial Court's determination. 
The Trial Court made no determination on this issue except as 
implied by ,, 28, Trial Court Findings, and ~ 10, Trial Court Conclu-
sions as quoted above with respect to Point I B. Conspicuous by their 
absence are any findings or conclusions with respect to whether PCR 
was required to file an assumed name certificate or whether such cer-
tificate was in fact filed. 
2. The uncontroverted facts. 
As discussed in Point I B 4 above, the facts recited in ,, 8 
- 16, Statement of Facts, clearly establish that PCR did not file the 
required assumed name certificate to do business under the assumed 
name of Skyline Realty or any other assumed name. Notwithstanding 
such failure, in its Answer to Appellant's Fourth Amended Complaint, 
PCR incorporated its Counterclaim as pled in its Answer to the First 
Amended Complaint. The introductory paragraph in that Counterclaim 
establishes without question that PCR was suing Appellant and prose-
cuting the Counterclaim in an assumed name. Such paragraph reads in 
pertinent part as follows: 
The defendant-counterclaimant Park City Reserva-
tions, Inc., dba Skyline Realty (hereinafter 
"Skyline") complains ••• as follows •••• 
(emphasis added) 
3. The law and its application to the facts. 
According to Section 42-2-5 of the Assumed Name Law, every 
corporation conducting its business in this state under an assumed 
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name must file an assumed name certificate with the office of the 
Secretary of State. If a corporation fails to file such certificat! 
that corporation "shall not ~, prosecute or maintain any action, 
suit, counterclaim, cross-complaint or proceeding in any of the cour 
of this state until the provisions of this chapter have been cornpli!: 
with." (emphasis added) Section 42-2-10, Assumed Name Law. 
We can find no cases that have considered the effect of our 
Section 42-2-10. There are three cases that considered Utah's assut' 
name statutory provisions prior to 1963 when Utah first enacted t~ 
language of Section 42-2-10 quoted above. Christenson v. Johnson, r 
Utah 273, 61 P. 2d 593 (1936): Oakason v. Lisbon Valley Uranium Co., 
154 F. Supp. 692 (D.C. Ut. 1957): and Platt v. Locke, 11 Utah 2d 271 
358 P.2d 95 (1961). However, with respect to our specific statutory 
prohibition against suing, prosecuting, or maintaining any counte~ 
claim in any of the courts of this state without first filing an 
assumed name certificate, the courts that have considered similar 
provisions in other states are unanimous in holding that such a 
statute means precisely what it says, viz: no suit without com-
pliance. 42 A.L.R. 2d 516, 533, Section 7. 
While it has been uniformly held that a claimant can remove 
such legal disability and acquire the capacity to sue simply by fiil 
the required certificate at any time before completion of the takin~ 
of evidence at trial, in the instant case at no time did PCR seek~ 
present any evidence that it had in fact filed such a certificate,~: 
did PCR seek a continuance of trial for a time long enough to enable 
PCR to file the required certificate. Instead PCR rested its case. 
Thereafter, following a noon recess, PCR sought to reopen its case, 
ES 
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but then only preferred evidence that Reed had acted in good faith 
with respect to PCR doing business under the assumed name of Skyline 
Realty. The Trial Court refused to permit the case to be reopened. 
one day later, following the conclusion of counsel for Appellant's 
opening argument, PCR expanded its profer of proof of the previous day 
to include evidence that prior counsel for PCR thought he had filed or 
had intended to file the required certificate for PCR, but that such 
certificate was not of record. See ,, 15, 16, Statement of Facts. 
The point is that none of the evidence proferred can change in the 
least the conclusion that at all times pertinent hereto, PCR was bur-
dened by a legal disability constituting PCR's lack of capacity to 
seek redress in the courts of this state. 
Note that Section 42-2-10 of the Assumed Name Law states 
"shall not sue, prosecute or maintain," while Section 61-2-lB(a) of 
the License Law discussed in Point I B above states "Shall [not] bring 
or maintain an action in any court of this state." Clearly then, what 
has been said earlier in Point I B above with respect to the courts 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction applies persuasively here, and the 
lack of capacity to sue encountered by PCR as a result of the legal 
disability created by Section 42-2-10 also constitutes a lack of sub-
ject matter jurisdiction entitling Appellant to dismissal of PCR's 
Counterclaim. 
Further, what has been said in Point I B above with respect 
to Respondent's contention that Appellant had waived the issue of lack 
of capacity applies equally here. 
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D. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING APPELLANT COMPEN. 
SATORY DAMAGES RESULTING FROM PCR' S BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DU' 
OR ITS DUTY TO ACT IN GOOD FAITH, AND SUCH DAMAGES ARE A 1 
TOTAL OFFSET TO PCR'S CLAIM AGAINST APPELLANT. 
1. The Trial Court's determination. 
The only Trial Court finding or conclusion on this iss~ h 
found in 11 8, Trial Court Conclusions, which paragraph reads in pert 
nent part as follows: 
The court finds that there is no factual basis for 
a finding of • • • breach of a duty to act in good 
faith, breach of a fiduciary duty .•• and the 
court concludes that none of the foregoing torts 
occurred in this case. 
Notwithstanding Appellant's request that the court makes~ 
cific findings as to whether Respondents had any duties to deal fai 
and in good faith with Appellant and whether each of the Respondent 
stood in a fiduciary relationship with Appellant and therefore ow~ 
any fiduciary duties to Appellant, and in spite of the fact that su 
issues had been raised by the pleadings and evidence had been pre-
sented with respect thereto, the court refused to make any findings 
to whether such duties were in fact owed or whether any of the Res1 
dents stood in a fiduciary relationship with Appellant. The Trial 
court only addressed the issue of whether such duties had been 
breached. See n 82 through 87 of the Findings of Fact and H 31 
through 38 of the Conclusions of Law attached to Plaintiff's Objei 
tion to Form of Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusi1 
of Law and Judgment dated June 23, 1980. 
2. The uncontroverted facts. 
After reviewing the facts recited in n 22, 31-33, 35-37, 
j - p, u, v, z, aa, Statement of Facts, can there be any question 
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this case but what Taylor acting on behalf of the Appellant innocently 
reposed confidence in Reed acting on behalf of PCR with whom Taylor 
bad enjoyed a mutually satisfactory broker to broker relationship for 
many years, and that Taylor justifiably assumed Reed would not take 
any action inconsistent with Appellant's rights under the Listing. On 
the other hand can there be any doubt that Reed was in a position of 
superiority and influence as to Taylor because Reed knew what Taylor 
did not know, namely that Appellant's principal, Unionamerica, had 
found and already negotiated with the Buyer before Reed and Cole had 
ever been involved. 
When Stevenson first involved Reed and Cole in the trans-
action and Reed and Cole did nothing to investigate Appellant's rights 
under the Settlement Agreement and the Listing, Appellant's soft 
underbelly was exposed, but Appellant didn't even suspect the danger 
because Taylor trusted his fellow broker, Reed. After Stevenson first 
involved Reed and Cole in the transaction on October 8, 1977, Cole 
sent the registration letter to Appellant without disclosing the fact 
i: that Unionamerica had found and negotiated with the Buyer without the 
assistance of Reed or Cole. The danger to Appellant was magnified 
because Reed and Cole were further solidifying PCR's position by 
telling the world that the Buyer was PCR's client for purposes of the 
subject sale. Later on October 15, 1977, when Reed personally 
n: approached Taylor to confirm that the multiple listing arrangement was 
in effect between them with respect to the subject transaction, Reed 
attempted to dig a deeper hole for Appellant by not revealing to 
Appellant that unionamerica had found and negotiated with the Buyer 
without the assistance of Reed or Cole. Still later, on October 19, 
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1977, Reed perpetuated the previous concealments by attempting to, 
the truth. This Reed did by simply telling Taylor a lie as tot~ 
source of the Buyer. We are talking about real estate agents, trui: 
fiduciaries, dealing with each other. Can such conduct on the part 
a fiduciary in this state be condoned. Not only condoned, but 
rewarded to the extent of $57,600. 
3. The law and its application to the facts. 
Appellant contends that the law of the State of Utah permi: 
Appellant to recover compensatory damages from PCR under the circu1· 
stances of this case, especially in light of Appellant's nconsidera: 
diminished" burden of proof with respect to the pertinent facts. 
While the Trial Court refused to rule one way or the other 
whether Appellant and PCR and their respective representatives were 
a fiduciary relationship and therefore owed fiduciary duties to e~ 
other, it is elementary that such was the case. 
As discussed previously in Point I A, in the relationsh~ 
between Appellant and PCR, Appellant was the principal and PCR was: 
agent. Hence, they were parties to a fiduciary relationship whicl 
brought with it the special duties that must be observed by parties 
such relationships. As was said in 37 Am. Jur.2d Fraud and Deceiti 
16: 
The cases of parent and child, guardian and 
ward, trustee and cestui que trust, principal and 
?gent and attorney and client are familiar 
instances in which the principal of fiduciary 
relationship applies in its strictest sense . 
(emphasis added) 
3 Am. Jur.2d Agency§ 199 elaborates on the agent's fiduciary dutyi 
follows: 
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An agent is a fiduciary with respect to the 
matte:s w~thi~ the scope of his agency. The very 
relation implies that the principal has imposed 
some trust or confidence in the agent and the 
agent or employee is bound to the exercise of the 
utmost good faith, loyalty, and honesty toward his 
principal or employer. (emphasis added) 
see also Tatsuno v. Kasai, 70 Utah 203, 259 P. 318, 62 A.L.R. 54 
(1927) • 
More specifically, according to Reese v. Harper, 80 Utah 2d 
119, 329 P.2d 410 (1958) a real estate broker is a party to a fidu-
ciary relationship and has the responsibility of honestly and fairly 
representing those who engage his services. 
According to the foregoing authorities, the fiduciary rela-
tionship between Appellant and PCR imposed on PCR the duty to exercise 
"good faith" toward Appellant. What does that mean? 
as: 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. (1979) defines "good faith" 
Honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of 
circumstances which ought to put the holder upon 
inquiry. An honest intention to abstain from 
taking any unconscious advantage of another even 
through technicalities of law, together with 
absense of all information, notice, or benefit or 
belief of facts which render the transaction un-
conscientious. (emphasis added) 
In point is the decision of Ammerman v. Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 
19 Utah 2d 261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967) wherein our court held that a 
cause of action predicated on bad faith can be properly regarded as a 
cause of action for a wrong done by violating a fiduciary duty owed. 
Thus our court equated the duty to act in good faith with the duty 
~ incurred in a fiduciary relationship. 
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The fiduciary relationship between Appellant and PCR ~~ 
brought with it the duty of avoiding any misrepresentations and mat 
full disclosure on the part of PCR. As was said in 12 Am. Jur .2d 
Brokers § 84 a broker: 
cannot put himself in the position right-
fully belonging to his principal. He cannot put 
himself in a position antagonistic to his princi-
pal 's interest by fraudulent conduct, acting 
adversely to his client's interest, or by failing 
to communicate information he may possess or 
require which is or may be material to his 
employer's advantage or otherwise. Standing in 
the place of and representing his employer, a 
broker is bound to disregard every feeling of 
friendship, to know no self interest, and to act 
as he judges the interest of his employer would 
induce the latter to act if he were present." 
(emphasis added) 
With respect to describing the duty of disclosure, our own 
Utah court has stated that such duty requires "good faith and the 
disclosure of all pertinent fact." Reich v. Christopolos, 123 Utah 
132, 256 P.2d 238 (1952), and requires "honesty, fair representatio 
and the making of all disclosures necessary." Shaw v. Abraham, 12 
Utah 2d 150, 364 P.2d 70 (1961). See also Reese v. Harper, supra. 
As has been said before, PCR comrni tted a serious breach ol 
confidence when it failed to make full disclosure to its princip~ 
that Reed and Cole had been approached on October 3, 1977 by Appel· 
lant's principal, Unionarnerica; when the registration letter was 
mailed on October 8, 1977; when Reed met with Taylor on October 15 
1977 and asked him to confirm their understanding as to splitting 
commission; and on October 19 when Reed intentionally mislead TaY1' 
as to the source of the Buyer. According to recent Utah authori~ 
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such conduct has been labeled not only as a breach of fiduciary duty, 
but also constructive fraud. 
In Blodgett v. Martsch, Utah, 590 P.2d 298 (1978) in holding 
that the trustee named in a trust deed was a party to a fiduciary 
relationship with the truster named in the same trust deed, our court 
neld that in cases involving a "confidential relationship" the "plain-
tiff's burden is considerably diminished." The court further held 
that the breach of fiduciary duty may be regarded as constructive 
fraud for the purpose of enabling the court to rectify any injury 
resulting from the breach of the obligations implicit in the rela-
tionship. Here, the rectification sought is simply to reverse the 
Trial Court's $57,600 reward to PCR for breaching its fiduciary duty 
to Appellant. In Blodgett the court also quoted with approval 37 Arn. 
Jur.2d 38 Fraud and Deceit § 15 which provides: 
. • • fraud is often presumed or inferred where a 
confidential or fiduciary relationship exists 
between the parties to a transaction or contract. 
Constructive fraud often exists where the 
parties to a transaction of a special confidential 
or fiduciary relation which affords the power and 
means to take undue advantage, or exercise undue 
influence over, the other. A course of dealing 
between ~ersons so situated is watched with 
extreme Jealously and solicitude7 and if there if 
found the slightest trace of undue influence or 
unfair advantage, redress will be given to the 
injured party. No part of the jurisdiction of the 
court is more useful than that which it exercises 
in watching and controlling transactions between 
parties standing in such a relationship of confi-
dence to each other • • • • 
Where a confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship exists it is the duty of the person in whom 
the conf ide~ce is reposed to exercise the utmost 
good faith in the transaction, to make full and 
truthful disclosures of all material facts and to 
refrain from abusing such confidence by obtaining 
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any advantage to himself at the expense of the 
confiding party. Should he obtain such advantage 
he will not be permitted to retain the benefit and 
the transaction will be set aside even though it 
could not have been impeached and no such relation 
existed, whether the unconscionable advantage was 
obtained by misrepresentations, concealment or 
suppression of material facts, artiface or undue 
influence. (emphasis added) 
As Reed himself said, his misleading of taylor was a "d~b 
and "ridiculous" thing to do. However, by such admission, Reed rat 
fies the conclusion that there is nothing in the record reasonably 
precluding the conclusion that PCR breached its fiduciary duty to 
Appellant and that Appellant is entitled to recover from PCR compen 
satory damages as an offset against any judgment awarded to PCR. 
There is another reason, perhaps peculiar to Utah, why in 
this case it must be said· that PCR breached its fiduciary duty to 
Appellant. According to Subsection 61-2-6(a) and (b) of the Li~M 
Law, the qualities of "honesty," "integrity," "truthfullness" and 
"trustworthiness" are prerequisites for all Utah licensed real es~ 
salesmen and brokers. Further, on November 11, 1973 pursuant to th 
rule making power conferred by Subsection 61-2-S(b) of the License 
Law, the State Securities Commission adopted the State of Utah Real 
Estate Licensing Laws Rules and Regulations, Rule 19 of which prori 
in pertinent part as follows: "Brokers are required to treat salesm 
and other brokers ethically and in accordance with good business pr 
tices." (emphasis added) 
It is Appellant's contention that Reed and Cole acting for 
PCR breached the duties imposed upon them by Rule 19. Note that Ru 
19 talks in terms of ethics and good business practices. Accordi~ 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth Ed. (1979) ethics has to due with 
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•moral" duties, beliefs, character, actions and that conduct which is 
•professionally right or befitting; conforming to professional stan-
dards of conduct." On the other hand, from the same source conduct is 
said to be moral if it consistent with the "general principals of 
right conduct" and "cognizable and enforceable only by the conscience 
or by the principals of right conduct, as distinguished from positive 
law." 
Although we are dealing here with relatively abstract 
notions, it is clear from the foregoing statutory provisions and Rule 
19, that real estate practioners in this state should be held to a 
very high standard of professional conduct, such that they be required 
to avoid the very appearance of impropriety. We can find no case that 
construes or applies Rule 19, but as a practical matter Rule 19 is 
probably just another way of saying that Reed and Cole, as agents, 
were required to act as fiduciaries with respect to Appellant and 
consequently discharge all obligations owed to Appellant implicit in 
that designation. One thing appears certain. Rule 19 does not 
d~inish PCR's duties or excuse its conduct. 
Based upon the foregoing discussion it appears obvious that 
in this case Appellant had the right to repose special trust and con-
fidence in Reed and Cole, and had the right to expect them to treat 
Appellant fairly, without misrepresentations, with full disclosure, 
with utmost loyalty, without betrayal, in good faith, ethically and in 
accordance with good business practices. 
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E. RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT I 
For all the reasons discussed in this Point I, Appellant 
respectfully requests an order of the court reversing the judgment 
PCR's Counterclaim in favor of PCR and against Appellant and the en 
of judgment thereon in favor of Appellant and against PCR, no cause 
action. 
POINT II 
ASSUMING THAT THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN HOLDING 
THAT PCR WAS ENTITLED TO RECOVER A SELLING BROKER'S 
COMMISSION FROM APPELLANT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN 
FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED 
TO COMPENSATORY DAMAGES FROM UNIONAMERICA AND STEVENSON 
IN AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE AMOUNT AWARDED PCR. 
A. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER COMPENSATORY 
DAMAGES FROM UNIONAMERICA AND STEVENSON AS A RESULT OF 
THEIR BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY. 
Like PCR, Unionamerica was a party to a fiduciary relatio 
ship with Appellant. However, in the case of the Unionamerica -
Appellant relationship, Unionamerica was the principal acting thro 
Stevenson while Appellant was the agent acting through Taylor. No 
theless, Unionamerica still owed a fiduciary duty to Appellant. 
was said in 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers § 167: 
It is a rule of universal recognition that the 
principal must act in good faith toward the broker, 
and in the event of his failure to do so, the 
broker will not be deprived of his commissions 
solely by reason of his employer's breach of duty. 
If the broker performs his part of the contract by 
doing all that he is required to do and is pre-
vented from or deprived of the opportunity.of. 
consummating the sale by the act of the principal, 
he is still entitled to his commission . 
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. • •• moreover, the principal cannot deprive 
his agent of the compensation stipulated for 
either by fraudulently making a sale himself at 
the same or different price, or by switching the 
buyer from one agent to another. (emphasis added) 
More specifically in 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers § 226, where an exclusive 
right to sell form of listing is the predicate for the agreement bet-
ween the owner and the broker, the rule is "there is an implied 
£romise on the part of the owner to do nothing to hinder or obstruct 
Eerformance by the broker." (emphasis added) 
follows: 
Again, in 3 Am. Jur.2d Agency§ 239, the rule is expressed as 
The principal is subject to a duty to his agent to 
perform the contract which is made with the agent 
and a duty not to repudiate or terminate the 
employment in violation of the contract. The 
principal must conduct himself in such a way as 
not to interfere with the consummation of the 
agency and the agency contract carries with it an 
implied obligation on the part of the principal to 
do nothing that would thwart the effectiveness of 
the agency. (emphasis added) 
When Stevenson called Appellant's office on the morning of 
October 3, 1977 and failed to involve any of Appellant's licensed 
personnel in the subject transaction; when Stevenson arrived in Park 
City the evening of October 3, 1977, and before even meeting with 
Davis, Stevenson involved Reed and Cole in the subject transaction 
instead of Appellant's licensed personnel; when, on October 4, 1977, 
after meeting with Davis the evening of October 3, 1977 and nego-
tiating the transaction with Davis for a period of 2 to 3 hours, 
Stevenson involved Reed and Cole in the subject transaction instead of 
Appellant's licensed personnel; and when Stevenson at no time there-
after took the initiative in disclosing to Appellant that he had 
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directed the Buyer to Reed and Cole, both Unionameria through Ste~ 
son, and Stevenson himself, breached their fiduciary duties to Appe:. 
lant and the implied promises inherent in the fiduciary relationshi; 
See ~ 42 g, i, n, p, Statement of Facts. 
According to Blodgett v. Martsch, supra, such conduct is 
tantamount to constructive fraud and according to the numerous autk 
rities cited above, Unionamerica and Stevenson are liable to Ap~Ur 
for the damages sustained by Appellant as a result of such construe· 
tive fraud and/or breach of fiduciary duty. Of course, if the Trial 
Court's judgment in favor of PCR is not affirmed, Appellant concedes 
that it would not be entitled to any such damages inasmuch as the 
Trial Court awarded the full amount of the Commission to Appellant 
subject to Appellant's obligation to split the Commission with PCR. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT RELIED ON JUDGE CROFT'S ORDER, SUCH ORD: 
IS PARTIALLY IN ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS NO IMPLIED 
AGREEMENT TO DIRECT ANY WALK-IN TO APPELLANT, AND THEREFORE 
ANY LIABILITY FROM APPELLANT TO PCR WAS WRONGFULLY CREATEDi 
UNIONAMERICA AND STEVENSON. 
With respect to Judge Croft's Order the Trial Court stated' 
trial "I am not here to say that he is wrong, and I can't say he is 
wrong." T. 567. That acknowledgment together with ~ 3, Memorandum 
Decision, Appendix B, and ,, 4, Trial Court Conclusions, Appendix C, 
make it clear that the Trial Court considered itself bound by Judge 
croft's order. While Judge Croft's Order was correct in holding pa 
had to both find and negotiate the subject sale in order to recovua 
selling broker's commission, it is Appellant's contention that a por· 
tion of Judge Croft's Order was erroneous as a matter of law. we 
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believe Appellant's position is apparent from a careful examination of 
the language of the Order itself. Judge Croft held: 
The court finds that the Settlement Agreement and 
the Listing Agreement contemplate that other 
parties not involved in the lawsuit might find 
buyers for the listed properties and negotiate a 
sale therefor, and that neither agreement contains 
any express or implied provision that Unionamerica 
or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer" to 
plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now resolved for 
all future proceedings in this case. 
With the phrase "or implied" in the Order, the Order doesn't make 
sense. By stating that "other parties not involved in the lawsuit 
might find buyers for the listed properties and negotiate a sale 
therefor," while at the same time stating that there is no implication 
that "Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct any 'walk in buyer' to 
plaintiffs" is to state two directly contrary propositions. There is 
simply no way that a party not included in the previous lawsuit that 
spawned the Settlement Agreement could have a walk-in buyer directed 
to such party by Unionamerica and still have such party be the finder 
of such buyer. In such a situation, Unionamerica, which was involved 
in the previous lawsuit, would be the finder of such buyer. More 
specifically, PCR, which was not a party to the previous lawsuit, 
can't be the finder of the Buyer if the Buyer was found by Unionamerica 
and directed to PCR. PCR can't be both the finder and Unionamerica's 
referee. Accordingly, the Settlement Agreement and Listing taken 
together clearly constitute an implied contract that Unionamerica 
would direct any walk-in buyer to Appellant, which is consistent with 
the authorities cited in Point II A above. 
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When Unionamerica through Stevenson referred Davis and the 
Buyer to Reed, Cole and PCR, Unionamerica breached its implied cove. 
nant to direct any walk-in to Appellant. Appellant's compensatory 
damages for such breach are equal to the amount, if any, which PO. 
entitled to recover from Appellant pursuant to PCR' s counterclaim. 
For the reasons discussed above in Point I, we don't believe PCR is 
entitled to any such recovery, but in the event any such award is 
affirmed, then such liability on the part of Appellant to PCR was 
wrongfully and intentionally created by Unionamerica and Stevensoo 
when Unionamerica breached its implied contract as aforesaid. 
The right to recover damages for the wrongful and inte~~ 
creation of a liability has been recognized in Section 87la of t~ 
Restatement of Torts 2d. The rule reads as follows: 
One who intentionally creates civil or criminal 
liability against another is subject to liability 
to the other if his conduct is generally culpable 
and not justifiable under the circumstances. 
As the official comment to Section 87la indicates, the Section appl'• 
to the established torts but also to wrongful action that does not 
fall within one of the established torts. Further, by reference to 
Section 871 Restatement of Torts 2d. and the official comment thereC' 
it is clear that the toJ:t recognized by Section 87la is intended to 
accentuate the various tortious means by which harmful invasions cl 
property interests are intentionally achieved, and to state a genera 
ization comparable to the generalizations on negligence in other 
sections of the Restatement. We gather from these official comment: 
that Section 87la is intended to be authority for the prosecuti~~ 
intentional torts that do not fit within any of the more traditiona: 
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-catagorizations. We think Appellant is entitled to recover pursuant 
to such authority in the instant case. 
As pointed out previously, Stevenson, acting on behalf of 
unionamerica, affirmatively and intentionally sought out Reed and Cole 
and through them PCR, to act as real estate agents with respect to the 
subject transaction. At the time Stevenson directed a walk-in buyer 
to Reed, Cole and PCR, Stevenson knew that he would be exposing Appel-
lant to the possibility of having to split its commission with the new 
real estate agents, and he did this at a time when he had caused 
unionamerica to grant an exclusive right to sell listing to Appellant, 
and the aforesaid implied covenant to direct a walk-in buyer to 
Appellant. See ' 42 i, Statement of Facts. Stevenson thus wrongfully 
and intentionall caused Unionamerica to breach its implied covenant to 
direct walk-in buyers to Appellant. 
We can find nothing in the record which controverts the facts 
presented which are pertinent to the elements of Section 87la as 
aforesaid. 
Again, if the Trial Court judgment in favor of PCR is 
reversed, Appellant concedes that it would not be entitled to any 
compensatory damages resulting from a vi.olation of Section 87la as 
aforesaid inasmuch as the Trial Court awarded the full amount of the 
Commission to Appellant subject to Appellant's obligation to split the 
Commission with PCR. 
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C. RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT II 
For all the reasons discussed in this Point II, Appellant 
respectfully requests this court to enter its judgment in favor of 
Appellant and against Unionamer ica, Inc., Rams hire, Inc., and Steve:. 
son for compensatory damages in an amount equal to the amount, if a~ 
awarded to PCR. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST ALL 
RESPONDENTS 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT UNIONAMERICA ACT!: 
REASONABLY IN DEPOSITING ALL OF THE COMMISSION WITH THE 
ESCROW HOLDER, AND CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO BASIS FOR 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST UNIONAMERICA FOR PUNITIVE DAMAG~ 
11 26, Trial Court Findings, provides: "Unionamer ica acted 
reasonably in • • • depositing these funds in an escrow account in 
light of the dispute." 11 9, Trial Court Conclusions, provides: 
The court having concluded that defendants were 
not guilty of tortious acts against the plain-
tiffs, and that none of the parties breached the 
applicable contracts, hereby concludes that there 
is no basis for plaintiff's claim for punitive 
damages. 
Appellant concedes that "in light of the dispute" it may har 
been reasonable for Unionamerica to deposit 60% of the Commission wi: 
the Escrow Holder, but we can find no evidence in the record, let 
alone any evidence about which reasonable minds could differ, that 
would justify Unionamerica placing the remaining 40% of the Commissl: 
with the Escrow Holder. 
-66-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
~ 
L 
As •~ 42 cc, 47 - S3, Statement of Facts establishes, at no 
time prior to suit being instituted did unionamerica even suggest that 
Appellant was not entitled to 40% of the Commission. As a matter of 
fact, Unionamerica through its counsel conceded: (1) that the with-
holding of any of the Commission would constitute a breach of contract 
on the part of Unionamerica; and (2) there was no basis for Union-
america withholding from Appellant more than 60% of the Conunission. 
Indeed, the judgment of the Trial Court awarding Appellant 100% of the 
Commission, but requiring that 60% thereof be shared, confirms what 
Unionamerica conceded all along. How can it be said then that Union-
america could justifiably have withheld 40% of the Commission from 
Appellant. 
Other events, both before and after suit was instituted, 
establish Unionamerica's cavalier, malicious and total disregard of 
Appellant's rights. See •• 25, 26, SS, S6, S8, S9, Statement of 
Facts. It should be noted that under Utah law an act is malicious if 
done "entirely without authority and in disregard of the rights" of 
~hers. Sproul v. Sparks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 (1949). 
In addition to its entitlement to compensatory damages 
resulting from breach of contract as discussed in Point II above, 
Appellant contends that Unionamerica is liable to Appellant for 
compensatory damages resulting from Unionamerica's intentional torts 
in diverting the commission from Appellant. Appellant also contends 
that punitive damages are recoverable for both reasons. Under present 
Utah law it apparently makes no difference whether Unionamerica's 
liability for punitive damages is bottomed on breach of contract, 
conversion, breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud or any other 
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reprehensible conduct deserving of punishment. In Nash v. Craiq~ 
--:. 
Inc., Utah, 585 P.2d 775 (1978) in holding that punitive damagesma 
be awarded regardless of whether compensatory damages are awarded 
'. 
was stated: 
The question of whether or not punitive damages 
can be given and the amount thereof shall be 
determined from the nature and type of the wrong-
ful conduct rather than on the amount of money 
awarded as actual damages since the purpose of the 
award is to teach the defendant to not repeat the 
wrong and to be a warning to others that such 
conduct is not to be tolerated. 
In his concurring opinion in that case, Judge Crockett wr0t, 
There is another aspect of the law of this state 
which gives support to the ruling of the main 
opinion. Our constitution, Section 19 of VIII 
provides that "there shall be but one from of 
civil action and law and equity may be admin-
istered in the same action." Pursuant to that 
provision and the adjudication of this court 
thereunder the trend of our law is and has been 
toward the abolition of distinctions between law 
and equity. This is particularly true since the 
adoption of our new rules of civil procedure to 
the effect that the court shall grant whatever 
relief the evidence shows a party is entitled to. 
These are additional reasons why I am in 
agreement with the proposition that the question, 
whether there should be an award of punitive 
damages and the amount thereof should depend on 
the nature of the wrong and not uesn an arbitary 
and what seems to me to be an artificial barrier 
thereto because of the nomenclature of the cause 
of action. (emphasis added) 
The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Boise Dodge,.!E£: 
v. Clark, 92 Idaho 904, 453 P. 2d 551 (1969) forthrightly makes the 
point that the court should not be impractically concerned over 
whether the claim sounds in contract or tort. In that case, the 
plaintiff had purchased a "new" automobile from the defendant. 
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automobile was, in fact, a well used demonstrator on which the odo-
meter had been turned back. The plaintiff recovered judgment which 
included an award of punitive damages. On appeal, the defendant 
argued that punitive damages were improperly awarded inasmuch as the 
case was one for breach of contract. The court rejected the defen-
dant's argument and held: 
In any event, from the legal point of view from 
the position of punitive damages in this case, it 
does not matter whether respondent's counterclaiiii 
technically sounded in contract or tort. The rule 
••• is that punitive damages may be assessed in 
contract actions where there is fraud, malice, 
oppression or other sufficient reason for doing 
so. The rule recognizes that in certain cases 
elements of tort, for which punitive damages have 
always been recoverable upon showing of malice, 
may be inextricably mixed with elements of con-
tract in which punitive damages are generally not 
recoverable. (emphasis added) 
That portion of the Idaho opinion has been favorably reviewed in Sul-
livan, "Punitive Damages in the Law of Contract: the Reality and the 
Illusion of Legal Change," 61 Minnesota Law Review 207, 239 (1977). 
Notwithstanding the general rule that punitive damages are not reco-
verable in breach of contract actions, there are well established 
exceptions to the rule which exceptions are applicable to the case at 
bar. Such exceptions appear in cases where the breaches of contract 
mount to breaches of fiduciary duties, breaches of duties to deal 
fairly and act in good faith, conversion, intentional or needless 
disregard of the consequences, malice, economi~ oppression or indepen-
dent torts arising out of breaches of contract, regardless of whether 
such tort is pled in contract or tort. The rationale, leading 
supporting cases, and propriety of such exceptions is thoughtfully 
discussed in "The Expanding Availability of Punitive Damages in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Contract Actions," 8 Indiana Law Review 668 (1975), which consideri· 
tions support the holding of our court in Nash v. Craig co. Inc,, 
supra. 
In the case at bar Unionamer ica was charged with conversk 
breach of fiduciary duty, breach of the duty to act in good faiu,, 
fraud, any one of which would serve as a predicate for an award of 
punitive damages in addition to the malicious breach of contract 
described. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE WAS NO 
BASIS FOR APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST STEVENSON, REED, COLE:. 
PCR FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
If the Appellant's positions with respect to Point I Dand· 
Point II above are sustained, then clearly the tortious conduct of 
Stevenson, Reed, Cole and PCR is the type of conduct for which, int 
words of Nash v. Craig Co., Inc., supra, we ought to "teach the def!:I 
dant not to repeat the wrong, and to be a warning to others that sue·' 
conduct is not to tolerated." Such conduct constituted a breach of 
fiduciary duty, breach of the duty to act in good faith, constructb 
fraud, and the failure to treat Appellant equitably and in accordan~ 
with good business practices in direct contravention of Rule 19. 
C. RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT III 
For all the reasons. discussed in this Point III, Appellant 
respectfully requests an order of the court remanding this matter~ 
the purpose of taking evidence to determine the amount of punitive 
damages which Appellant is entitled to recover against all Responden~ 
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I· 
the purpose of taking evidence to determine the amount of punitive 
damages which Appellant is entitled to recover against all Respondents. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT WAS NOT 
ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS AGAINST 
UNIONAMERICA, AND APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO SUCH AWARD 
INCLUDING SUCH ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS INCURRED WITH 
RESPECT TO THIS APPEAL 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS FOR 
PROSECUTING COUNT I OF THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1. The Trial Court's determination. 
Count I of the Fourth Amended Complaint simply states a cause 
of action against Unionamerica for breach of Unionamerica's agreement 
to pay 100% of the Commission to Appellant. ~ 1, Judgment, granted 
'
1
'1 Appellant judgment against Unionamerica, Inc. for the full amount of 
I 
1c·
1 
I~ 
o: 
the Commission, and ~ 6, Judgment, stated that the parties should bear 
their own costs. However, the Memorandum Decision and the Trial Court 
Findings and the Trial Court Conclusions are silent on the issue of 
attorneys' fees and costs. 
2. The uncontested facts. 
Pursuant to the Listing, Unionamerica agreed "in case of the 
employment of an attorney to enforce this agreement or any rights 
arising out of the breach thereof ••. to pay a reasonable attorneys' 
fee and all costs of collection." 
As was pointed out in Point III A above, prior to trial 
n~ Unionamerica knew that its failure to pay 100% of the Commission to 
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Appellant was a breach of the Listing, yet Unionamerica wouldn't ev:. 
pay Appellant the 40% of the Commission which Unionamerica concedec 
all along was owed to Appellant. 
3. The law and its application to the facts. 
Appellant concedes that the award of attorneys' fees and 
costs and the amount thereof is discretionary with the Trial Court, 
However, Appellant contends that the Trial Court abused its discret: 
in this instance. If Appellant's position with respect to either 
Point I or Point II sustained, then certainly there would be no 
question but what Unionamerica' s failure to pay all of the Commissi: 
to Appellant was totally unjustified and Appellant would be entitle! 
to an award of attorneys' fees and costs. However, even if the jud: 
ment in favor of PCR and against Appellant is not reversed, Appellr 
contends that it is entitled to an award of its attorneys' fees and 
costs for the reason that Unionamer ica wouldn't even pay 40% of the 
Commission to Appellant without this suit. Further, it was not unt: 
after suit was instituted that Unionamerica for the first time deni! 
that it owed any part of the Commission to Appellant on the ground 
that Appellant had not performed its duties and discharged its obli· 
gations pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and the Listing. 
Accordingly, Appellant had to present substantial evidence at trial 
overcome that denial. As is clear from ~ 2, Memorandum Decision, I 
Trial Court Conclusions and ~ 1, Judgment, the Trial Court ruled 
against Unionamerica on that issue in holding that Appellant fullY 
performed its obligations. 
-72-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT APPELLANT WAS 
NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS FOR 
PROSECUTING COUNT III OF THE FOURTH AMENDED COMPLAINT 
1. The Trial Court's determination. 
Count III of the Fourth Amended Complaint simply stated a 
cause of action against Unionamerica for breach of Unionamerica's 
agreement pursuant to the Settlement Agreement and the exclusive 
listing contemplated thereby to pay a 6% real estate commission to 
Appellant resulting from the sale of the Davis property. The prayer 
following Count III of the Fourth Amended Complaint read as follows: 
WHEREFORE, [Appellant] demands judgment ordering 
Unionamerica and/or Ramshire to enter into the 
Davis Listing with [Appellant] and against Union-
america and Ramshire, jointly and severally, in an 
amount equal to 6% of the purchase price of the 
Davis Property as compensatory damages, together 
with interest thereon as permitted by law, exem-
plary damages in an amount appropriate to punish 
and set an example of Unionamerica and Ramshire, 
for [Appellant's] reasonable attorneys' fee and 
costs incurred herein, and for such other and 
further relief as the court deems proper in the 
premises. 
e After obvious consideration of Count III and the prayer thereof, ! S, 
Memorandum Decision, reads as follows: "That plaintiff is entitled to 
the relief demanded in Count III of its Fourth Amended Complaint and 
is awarded judgment as therein prayed." 
Notwithstanding the foregoing specific language of the 
Memorandum Decision, the Trial Court Findings and the Trial Court 
Conclusions, as pointed out before, are silent on the issue of attor-
neys' fees and cos ts. 
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2. The uncontested facts. 
In Paragraph 32 of the aforesaid Count III, Appellant ~h 
that pursuant to the provisions of the Settlement Agreement had Uni 
america acted properly, Unionamerica would have entered into a l~ 
with respect to the Davis property, which listing would have been[ 
the same form as the Listing, which form as noted above in Point IV 
2, obligated Unionamerica to pay Appellant's attorneys' fees and 
costs. Said Paragraph 32 also alleged that Unionamer ica intentiona 
failed to notify Appellant of its intention to sell the Davis pro~ 
and intentionally failed to enter into a listing agreement with 
respect to the Davis property, all in order to avoid having to pay 
Appellant the commission on the sale of the Davis property. In lig 
of~ 5, Memorandum Decision, as quoted above, by implication the Tr 
Court made findings of fact favorable to Appellant on those issues. 
3. The law and Its Application to the Facts. 
Notwithstanding the Trial Court's failure to treat the iss 
of attorneys' fees and costs in the Trial Court Findings and the Tr 
Court Conclusions, it is obvious from ~ 1, Memorandum Decision, tha 
the Trial Court granted Appellant's demand for such an award, and 
Appellant contends that the Trial Court's failure to take evidence' 
to the amount of such award was an abuse of the Trial Court's discri 
tion. 
C. APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES ANI 
COSTS INCURRED WITH RESPECT THIS APPEAL 
It is well settled that an award of attorneys fees and cosl 
incurred in prosecuting the appeal is discretionary with the supremi 
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court. Swain v. Salt Lake Real Estate and Investment co., 3 Utah 2d 
121. 279 P.2d 709 (1955); Bates v. Bates, Utah, 560 P.2d 706 (1977) 
and Centurian Corp. v. Kripps, the opinion of the Utah Supreme court 
in which case as filed on January 29, 1981 and for which counsel has 
no Pacific citation. 
D. RELIEF REQUESTED WITH RESPECT TO POINT IV 
For all the reasons discussed in this Point IV, Appellant 
respectfully requests an order of the court remanding this matter for 
the purpose of taking evidence to determine the amount of attorneys' 
fees and costs including such attorneys' fees and costs incurred with 
respect to prosecuting this appeal, which Appellant is entitled to 
recover against Unionamerica. 
CONCLUSION 
Because PCR was not the procuring cause of the subject sale, 
1t because PCR was not a licensed real estate broker, because PCR had not 
filed the required assumed name certificate, and because PCR breached 
a' its fiduciary duty to Appellant, with respect to PCR' s Counterclaim 
:e· Appellant is entitled to a judgment in its favor and against PCR, no 
cause of action as a matter of law. In the alternative, because 
Unionamerica and Stevenson breached their fiduciary duties to 
lD Appellant and wrongfully and intentionally created a liability against 
Appellant, Appellant is entitled to judgment in its favor against 
;t: 
Unionamerica and Stevenson for compensatory damages in an amount equal 
oe 
to the amount, if any, awarded to PCR on PCR's Counterclaim. Because 
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of the breaches of contract and/or torts committed by Respondents, 
Appellant is entitled to have the matter remanded for consideratio~ 
the amount of punitive damages which Appellant is entitled to rec01, 
from all Respondents. Because of Unionamer ica' s breach of contract 
Appellant is entitled to have this matter remanded to determine th! 
amount of attorneys' fees and costs Appellant is entitled to recove: 
from Unionamerica. In the alternative, Appellant is entitled toa· 
trial. 
Respectfully Submitted 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUW 
i~--<1 -r-=- '-L.--·s 2-
KENT B LINEBAUGH 
370 East South Temple, Suite 401 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
(801) 532-7700 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, 1981, I sm 
two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant upon F. S. Prince, Jr 
Esq. of Prince, Yeates & Geldzhaler at 425 East 5th South, Third F~ 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 and Stephen G. Crockett, Esq. of Marti~• 
Rooker, Larsen & Kimball at 36 South State Street, No. 1800, Salt Li· 
City, UT 84111 or by leaving the same at his office with his clerk 
other person in charge thereof. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
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". ~..;.. J i9iJ 
Kent B Linebaugh 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
79 South State Street 
400 Conrnercial Security Bank Building 
P. 0. Box 11503 
: 1 LED 
Salt Lake City, Uta:1 84147 
Telephone; (801) 532-7700 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COUNTY OF SUl1l'IT, STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a 
Utah corporation, an<l 
HAROLD 1-1. TAYLO" .. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. 
) 
) 
) 
UNIONAJ.!ETUCA, I!IC. , a cor- ) 
poration, aka WESTHOR; ) 
RA!~SHIRE, I:lc. , a corpora- ) 
tion; WIT.T.TMf R. STEVl·:NSON;) 
!'AIU~ CITY i<J;s1·:1tvAT LON~;, ) 
INC., a corporation dl"' ) 
SKYLINE REALTY; HARRY F. ) 
REED; and GARY COLE, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
~~~~~~~~~~-> 
O:lDER DENYING tfOTION OF 
DC!'ENDAHTS' SKYLlllE, REED AND 
COLE FOR PARTIAL SUl1!1ARY Jll'"Jl.}!ENT 
Civil No. 5557 
0 R D E R 
This matter hnvinr, come on Eor hearing r>ursuanc co 
Notice before the above entitle<l Court on the 2nd <lay o( 
April, 1979, Plaintiffs appearing by and through their 
counsel of record, Kent B Linebaugh of Jardine. Linebaugh, 
llro'm E. Dunn, an<l Defon<lants Skyline, Rce<l an<l Cole 
appearing by and throu3h their. co11I1sel of record, Stephen 
G. Crockett of Martineau & Maak, and l)efendants Union-
america, Ramshire an<l Stevenson appearing by an<l through 
their couns<.:l o ( recor<l, DonaJ.<l J. Winder o ( rrincc, 
Yeates & Geldzahler, the Court having heard the agruments 
of counsel an<l considered the relevant memorandum filed in 
behalf of Defendants Skyline, Reed and Cole, and being ocher-
wise fully ~<lvise<l in the premises, 
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The Court finds that the Settlement Agreement and the 
Listing Agreement contemplate that other parties not in-
valved in the Lawsuit might find buyers for the L~stc<l 
properties and negotiate a sale therefor, and that neither 
Agreement contains any express or implied provision that 
Unionamerica or Ramshire would direct any "walk in buyer" 
to Plaintiffs. Such issues are thus now resolv~J for all 
future proceedings in this case. 
But further issues of fact remain to be determined 
with respect to Counts V, VI, IX, X and XI and, 
IT IS HE~.EBY ORDICRED that the Motion of DeCendants 
Skyline, Reed and Cole Car Po.rtial Summary Judp,ment oC 
Dismissal of saiJ Counts be1nd -~s hereby denieJ. 
DATED this £day o~ 1979. 
I hereby 
this ~day 
in the United 
addressed to: 
CERTIFICATE OF SER'!ICE 
certify that the foregoing Order was served 
of May, 1979 by depositing copies of same 
States mail, first class postage prepaid, 
Stephen G. Crockett 
l~rtineau & Maak . 
Attornevs for Defendants Skyline, Reed and.: 
36 So. State, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 3411L 
Donnld J. ~inder 
Prince, Yeates & Gcldz~hler . 
Attorneys for Defendants·Unionamerica, 
:ind Stevenson 
424 s~st 5th South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Kent B Lineh.:iu:",h 
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,. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THI:: THIRD .JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
Ll AND FOi{ SUl-fr!IT COUllTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HAL TAYLOR ASSOCIATES, a 
L'.t.ah ...:orporat:ion. and 
llAROLD W. TAYLOR. 
Plo.intiffs, 
vs. 
:,., i..J:\,\..r.'-:ERICA. I~:c. , a corp-
o r .:.it: iun, ak<.a ;\CST!-lOR; ~\}i-
St-l I RE, I:·!C. a corpor~tion; 
P,\RK CITY RESCRV.-\TIO?TS. INC., 
a corporation, Jb~ SK~LI~IE 
Rl:AL:'Y, 11.i\l\l\Y F. l\EE[); and 
c;;,r,_y COL!::, 
DC fc.:ndancs. 
~11::~10RA;lQL1'1 Dl':CISION 
CIVIL NO. 555 7 
The Court is o( the opinion that the record of this case 
..ind thi: ~vide:nce .:iu?ro:·t.:s t.:hc following findings on che issues 
;irc::ienLcd. 
1'ho.t P~r~: C[Ly Rcs~rvatio11s, Inc. was a licenseJ 
real e:..>i:..Lt~ brokl'r at .111 times <n.:i.terial to th~ issues of this case. 
2. H~l ·i·a:1lvr :\ssociaces <lid µcrform all services and dis-
charc~J all. obl.: ... ~•H.ions required of it by the Settlel!lent Agreement 
.:Jr.J the Villiag~ lisc::.ni_;. 
J. Tbe orJ~r of Judg2 Croft entered June 4, 1979, is a 
valid and b i.ndinr, orJ~r which resolved all issues therein together 
~;ich all future prucccdi11gs of this case. 
4.. l'h.:ic. i.:he St::t:ClL.?mcnc Agreement was !:!£..£. refoIT.led by any 
oral az;reemcnl of t:h~ parties or mutual mistake of the parcies. 
S. ThnL ~laindff is entitled to the relief demanded in 
Count III of !.ts Fourth Amended Complaint and is awarded judgmenc 
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KAL T,\YLOli., ET ,\L 
u:IIONAl'J:::\I CA, !::T AL 
• 
6. That chc claims of plaincii£s on all other co~~ 
their fourth .\Ir,t=nc.ie<l CompL:i.int are not ::.;upported by the rtccr: 
che evidence anJ the Court finds in favor of the dcfendana ~ 
against the plaintiffs. 
7. That the real estate como1ission now held in esc:a. 
ge cher wi ch all accumuli1-ted inceres c should be divided 40% ,,,, 
pl.:iinciffs and 60~~ t.:o lhe defendant Park City Reservations,:~: 
The Court ·,;uuld request chat both counsel for defend":: 
_join in preparing anJ submitting findings of Fact, Co11cl~s~o~s 
Law and Judgn1enc consi:>t(!nt with thf;;! foregoing ruling to chc c:~ 
pursuant co cha rule• of the Third Judicial District Court. 
1930. 
JAl!ES S. SAWAYA, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
